This paper applies evolutionary economics reasoning to the strategic alliance context and examines whether and how routinization processes at the partnering-firm level influence the performance of the cooperative agreement. In doing so, it introduces the concept of interorganizational routines, defined as stable patterns of interaction among two firms developed and refined in the course of repeated collaborations, and suggests that partner-specific, technology-specific, and general experience accumulation at the partnering-firm level influence the extent to which alliances result in knowledge accumulation, create new growth opportunities, and enable partnering firms to achieve their strategic objectives. We also consider how governance design choices at the transaction level shape the effectiveness of interorganizational routizination processes. Based on a sample of 145 biotechnology alliances, we find that only partner-specific experience has a positive impact on alliance performance, and that this effect is stronger in the absence of equity-based governance mechanisms. We interpret these results to support the role of interfirm coordination and cooperation routines in enhancing the effectiveness of collaborative agreements.

In contrast to prior studies examining strategic alliances as discrete governance structures (e.g., alliances vs. M&A, equity vs. non-equity agreements), we investigate their particular contractual features. The analysis examines the dimensionality of the contractual complexity construct and investigates the determinants of firms' adoption of various contractual provisions. We find two underlying dimensions of contractual complexity, based upon the enforcement and coordination functions of different contractual provisions. The evidence reveals that firms' usage of particular contractual provisions is a function of asset specificity as well as whether the alliance's duration is pre-specified or open-ended. The findings also speak to the debate surrounding the roles of prior ties and trust for alliance governance. Firms that have collaborated with each other in the past are not less likely to negotiate enforcement provisions; rather, repeat collaborators are less likely to adopt contractual provisions that are informational in nature and are geared to the coordination of the alliance.

International audienceThis paper investigates how firms' decisions to outsource or internalize production affect their technological performance. While several popular arguments and some anecdotal evidence suggest a direct association between outsourcing and technological performance, the effects of firms' governance decisions are likely to be contingent upon several specific attributes underlying a given exchange. This paper first demonstrates how standard performance models can improperly suggest a positive relationship between firms' outsourcing decisions and their technological performance. Models that account for firm- and transaction-specific features are then presented, which indicate that neither outsourcing nor internalization per se result in superior performance; rather, a firm's technological performance is contingent upon the alignment between firms' governance decisions and the degree of contractual hazards. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Research streams on competition and cooperation are central to the field of strategic management but have evolved independently. The emerging literature on coopetition has brought attention to the phenomenon of simultaneous competition and cooperation, yet the interplay between the two has remained under-researched. We offer a roadmap for studying this interplay, which identifies some of its antecedents and consequences, highlights debates concerning the nature of competition and cooperation and the association between the two, and directs attention to the tension between competition and cooperation and the alternative approaches for managing this tension. We discuss the broader implications of the interplay, note some intriguing open questions, offer directions for future research, and present an organizing framework for the interplay of competition and cooperation.

This paper investigates the occurrence and determinants of post‐formation governance changes in strategic alliances, including alterations in alliances' contracts, boards or oversight committees, and monitoring mechanisms. We examine alliances in the biotechnology industry and find that firms' unique alliance experience trajectories affect the likelihood of such ex post adjustments in these partnerships. Transactional features such as the alliance's scope, its division of labor, and the relevance of the collaboration to the parent firm also bear upon alliances' dynamics. We discuss the implications of these findings and how they complement prior research focusing on alliance design or termination at opposite ends of the alliance life cycle. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Research summary:This article provides a review of real options theory (ROT) in strategic management research. We review the fundamentals of ROT and provide a taxonomy of this research. By synthesizing and critiquing research on real options, we identify a number of important challenges as well as opportunities for ROT if it is to enhance its impact on strategic management and potentially develop into a theoretical pillar in the field. We examine how ROT can inform the key tensions that managers face between commitment versus flexibility as well as between competition versus cooperation, and we show how it can uniquely address the fundamental issues in strategy. We conclude with suggestions on future research directions that could enhance and unify the thus-far distinct main approaches to real options research. (e.g., joint ventures [JVs], foreign direct investment, research and development [R&D], etc.) and strategic decision making under uncertainty. This article provides a synthesis of this body of research in strategic management and related disciplines. We suggest how ROT can address fundamental issues of strategy, including the dilemmas managers face between commitment versus flexibility as well as between competition versus cooperation. We discuss how three distinct approaches to real options analysis can complement each other, and we identify some of the main challenges and opportunities for ROT to become a theoretical pillar in strategy. Managerial summary: Real options theory (ROT) applies the heuristics and valuation models originally designed for financial securities to the domain of corporate investment decisions

In this article, we examine the contingent effects of signals generated by different types of networks on new ventures' formation of future strategic alliances. We argue that the signaling value of a given tie in reducing adverse selection is more pronounced when another type of tie is lacking. In particular, we suggest that signals associated with (i) a new venture's affiliations with venture capitalists (VCs) that have prominent positions in syndicate networks and (ii) a new venture's prominent position in alliance networks resulting from previous alliances offer redundant benefits. As a result, the positive effect of VC prominence in determining a new venture's future alliance formation diminishes as the new venture's prominence in alliance networks increases. Evidence from biotech alliances between new ventures and established companies provides support for our theory.

No abstract