This study investigated theoretical claims that different emotional disorders are associated with different patterns of cognitive bias, both in terms of the cognitive processes involved and the stimulus content that is preferentially processed. These claims were tested by comparing clinically anxious (generalized anxiety disorder [GAD], posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]) and clinically depressed children and adolescents on a range of cognitive tasks measuring attention, memory, and prospective cognition, with both threat-related and depressogenic stimulus materials. The results did reveal some relative specificity of processing in that the anxious participants exhibited a greater selective attentional bias for threat relative to depressogenic material with no such difference being apparent in the depressed sample. However, this bias was only clear-cut on a dot-probe measure of attentional processing and not on a modified Stroop measure, and indeed threat-related bias on the 2 tasks was uncorrelated. On the prospective cognition task, anxious participants exhibited an other-referent bias in their risk estimations regarding future negative events that was absent in the depressed sample. No specificity effects were evident on the memory task. The results are discussed in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of carrying out direct comparisons across groups and tasks versus drawing conclusions from overall patterns across multiple studies.

This study investigated theoretical claims that different emotional disorders are associated with different patterns of cognitive bias, both in terms of the cognitive processes involved and the stimulus content that is preferentially processed. These claims were tested by comparing clinically anxious (generalized anxiety disorder [GAD], posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]) and clinically depressed children and adolescents on a range of cognitive tasks measuring attention, memory, and prospective cognition, with both threat-related and depressogenic stimulus materials. The results did reveal some relative specificity of processing in that the anxious participants exhibited a greater selective attentional bias for threat relative to depressogenic material with no such difference being apparent in the depressed sample. However, this bias was only clear-cut on a dot-probe measure of attentional processing and not on a modified Stroop measure, and indeed threat-related bias on the 2 tasks was uncorrelated. On the prospective cognition task, anxious participants exhibited an other-referent bias in their risk estimations regarding future negative events that was absent in the depressed sample. No specificity effects were evident on the memory task. The results are discussed in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of carrying out direct comparisons across groups and tasks versus drawing conclusions from overall patterns across multiple studies.

The results of the study are interpreted as a consolidation and extension of previous research on attentional bias and emotional disorder in younger participants.

Adult post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) patients often report a wide range of cognitive problems in memory, concentration, attention, planning, and judgement. Evaluation of these cognitive aspects of PTSD in adults has helped to define the nature of the disorder. However, there is a paucity of such work in younger subjects. This study has employed the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT) to examine cognitive factors in children and adolescents with PTSD. Eighteen child and adolescent patients with PTSD and 22 control subjects completed the test. PTSD subjects showed poorer overall memory performance compared with controls. Specifically, they were worse on the prospective and orientation items of the RBMT. The results are discussed in the light of research on everyday memory in adults with PTSD.

The objective of this study was to investigate the efficacy of memory specificity training (MEST) on autobiographical memory recall and depression. Afghan adolescents with depression were randomly assigned to a MEST group or to a control group. At baseline, both groups completed Persian versions of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) and the Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (MFQ). The MEST group then had five weekly group sessions of MEST. The control group had no additional contact. The AMT and MFQ were then readministered to all participants, and the MFQ was readministered at 2-month follow-up. The MEST group retrieved a higher proportion of specific memories following training and had lower levels of depression at 2-month follow-up than did the control group. Change in memory specificity predicted follow-up depression over and above baseline depression and mediated the relationship between receipt of MEST and reduction in later depression. The results suggest that MEST can improve autobiographical memory performance and drive subsequent reduction in depression symptoms.

These findings indicate that attentional bias to trauma-congruent information is a function of PTSD in young age groups. The results are discussed with respect to the literature on information processing in PTSD.

No abstract

Cognitive theories of anxiety based on adult data predict that individuals vulnerable to anxiety should show threat-related interpretations of ambiguous material and it is proposed that this is an important maintaining factor in anxiety disorders. In the present study, interpretation of ambiguous emotional/neutral information was examined in child and adolescent anxious patients. Two groups of participants, anxious patients (n = 17) and healthy controls (n = 40), were presented with a series of homographs, each with a threatening and a neutral interpretation. For each homograph, the participants were asked to construct a sentence using the homograph. Anxious children and adolescents produced significantly more sentences consistent with threatening homograph interpretations and less consistent with neutral interpretations than did normal controls. Regression analyses revealed no relationship between age and this interpretive bias. Preliminary developmental and theoretical implications are discussed.