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The responses to the attacks illustrated the remarkable gulf in strategic culture between the two sides of the Atlantic. The US-declared a 'global war on terrorism' and directed the full resources of a 'national security' approach towards the threat posed by a 'new terrorism'. Overseas policy has been shaped by the identification of a nexus between international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and 'states of concern'. At home the US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened the sources of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and courts and overhauled its intelligence and security agencies. Meanwhile the Pentagon adopted a new strategic plan that emphasised non-military instruments and more co-operation with allies.2 In bureaucratic terms the arrival of Condoleeza Rice at the State Department has had a catalytic effect, accelerating thischange. To what extent does this presage a more convergent transatlantic approach to international terrorism? This article suggests that while strategic doctrines may change, the more immutable nature of strategic culture will make convergence difficult.Moreover, while some officials have begun to identify the shape of current problems more accurately, their slippery nature mean that neither Europe nor America yet has convincing answers.2 Strategic CulturesStrategic culture remains an ill-defined and under-utilised concept. Its employment must be accompanied by an acknowledgment of its limitations, accepting that even amongst political sociologists, ideas such as 'culture' remain contested. 3 Strategic culture is based on the understanding that states are predisposed by their historical experiences, political system and culture, to deal with security issues in a particular way. Other factors may influence a state's strategic choices, such as its level of technological development, but its preferences will be shaped most strongly by its past. These institutional memories will help to determine how threats are perceived, as well as conditioning the likely responses. 4Officials quickly absorb the unspoken norms associated with a strategic culture, which may be as important in ruling out policy options that are 'inappropriate', as they are in determining the precise nature of paths taken.5

The World Health Organization wishes to express its appreciation to all those whose efforts madethe production of this monographpossible. An international group of experts met in Kuala Lumpa, Malaysia and from that meeting provided the material for the book and undertook ap rocess of mutual review.W hile authorship of individual chaptersi sn otedb elow, the quality of the volume as aw hole is due in large part to the review and comments provided by many individuals. Intellectual input and review by the following individuals is gratefully acknowledged:

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