Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?

Abstract

The responses to the attacks illustrated the remarkable gulf in strategic culture between the two sides of the Atlantic. The US-declared a 'global war on terrorism' and directed the full resources of a 'national security' approach towards the threat posed by a 'new terrorism'. Overseas policy has been shaped by the identification of a nexus between international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and 'states of concern'. At home the US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened the sources of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and courts and overhauled its intelligence and security agencies. Meanwhile the Pentagon adopted a new strategic plan that emphasised non-military instruments and more co-operation with allies.2 In bureaucratic terms the arrival of Condoleeza Rice at the State Department has had a catalytic effect, accelerating thischange. To what extent does this presage a more convergent transatlantic approach to international terrorism? This article suggests that while strategic doctrines may change, the more immutable nature of strategic culture will make convergence difficult.Moreover, while some officials have begun to identify the shape of current problems more accurately, their slippery nature mean that neither Europe nor America yet has convincing answers.2 Strategic CulturesStrategic culture remains an ill-defined and under-utilised concept. Its employment must be accompanied by an acknowledgment of its limitations, accepting that even amongst political sociologists, ideas such as 'culture' remain contested. 3 Strategic culture is based on the understanding that states are predisposed by their historical experiences, political system and culture, to deal with security issues in a particular way. Other factors may influence a state's strategic choices, such as its level of technological development, but its preferences will be shaped most strongly by its past. These institutional memories will help to determine how threats are perceived, as well as conditioning the likely responses. 4Officials quickly absorb the unspoken norms associated with a strategic culture, which may be as important in ruling out policy options that are 'inappropriate', as they are in determining the precise nature of paths taken.5

Degrading and Managing Risk: Assessing Australia's Counter-Terrorist Strategy

“…There remains, moreover, a dearth of mainstream academic analysis on comparative counter-terrorism strategies across different countries and regions. This is slowly changing, with the recent emergence of some thoughtful analysis of counter-terrorist developments worldwide (see Rees and Aldrich 2005;Omand 2005-06;Nacos 2006;Bures 2006). Yet, there remains little meaningful theoretical scholarship examining what constitutes effective counter-terrorist strategy.…”

Great expectations: the use of armed force to combat terrorism

“…This indication also goes against the often heard claim that Europeans, the focus of the TWEED database, are generally considered to be soft on terrorism. 33 Third, the track record of the United States in dealing with terrorism affecting the American mainland is highly favorable to the judiciary process.…”

The Muslim Question in Europe

“…One draws a fi rm distinction between U.S. and European strategies. Th e U.S. government allegedly treats terrorism primarily as an external threat and therefore prefers military action such as the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq to thwart terrorists before they can reach U.S. shores; European governments purportedly consider terrorism largely "homegrown," such as in the case of the 7/7 bombers, and therefore prefer a combined strategy of domestic police action to arrest terrorists and integration to discourage radicalization (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006;Rees and Aldrich 2005;Leiken 2005;Kagan 2004). Th e theory downplays or altogether ignores the fact that several European governments have allied with the United States in international military operations, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan or the "Coalition of the Willing" in Iraq (Keohane 2008).…”