SummaryThe glandular stomach has two major zones: the acid secreting corpus and the gastrin cell-containing antrum. Nevertheless, a single gland lies at the transition between the forestomach and corpus in the mouse stomach. We have sought to define the lineages that make up this gland unit at the squamocolumnar junction. The first gland in mice showed a notable absence of characteristic corpus lineages, including parietal cells and chief cells. In contrast, the gland showed strong staining of Griffonia simplicifolia-II (GSII)-lectin-positive mucous cells at the bases of glands, which were also positive for CD44 variant 9 and Clusterin. Prominent numbers of doublecortin-like kinase 1 (DCLK1) positive tuft cells were present in the first gland. The first gland contained Lgr5-expressing putative progenitor cells, and a large proportion of the cells were positive for Sox2. The cells of the first gland stained strongly for MUC4 and EpCAM, but both were absent in the normal corpus mucosa. The present studies indicate that the first gland in the corpus represents a unique anatomic entity. The presence of a concentration of progenitor cells and sensory tuft cells in this gland suggests that it may represent a source of reserve reparative cells for adapting to severe mucosal damage. (J Histochem Cytochem 65:47-58, 2017)

Since normalising diplomatic relations

No abstract

No abstract

Nuclear weapons have lost none of their capacity to stir serious debate among scholars and policy-makers. Despite the passage of time since the Cold War-a period during which the harsh reality of mutual assured destruction pervaded relations between the superpowers-there remains a wide gulf dividing both policy-makers and non-government experts over what the appropriate role for nuclear weapons should be in the twenty-first century. This debate has ebbed and flowed over the past two decades and has been characterized by surges of optimism from those who believe nuclear weapons will be consigned to the dustbin of history in the near future and matching surges of pessimism from those who maintain that nuclear weapons will always be with us.In recent discussions, significant attention has focused on the issue of nuclear deterrence and the closely related question of whether security guarantees from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states involving the possible use of nuclear weapons have a place in the twenty-first-century global strategic landscape. While some have sought to highlight what they see as the continuing utility of extended nuclear deterrence, other contributors to the literature remain sceptical that it has a role to play in stabilizing strategic relationships among states. Some, indeed, argue that extended nuclear deterrence constitutes a major obstacle to reducing the salience of nuclear weapons worldwide. According to this perspective, by reifying nuclear deterrence as a dimension of the security guarantees that lie at the heart of its alliance networks, the United States is effectively blocking progress towards bringing the number of nuclear weapons down to levels where complete disarmament can become a feasible option for policymakers. 1 Others have even claimed that, given doubts about whether any US administration would actually consider employing nuclear weapons in situations other than when American territory is threatened directly by a nuclear-armed adversary, extended deterrence is merely a rhetorical device designed to shore up alliances. As one leading expert has observed, 'there is no such thing as "the nuclear umbrella" … one US administration after the other has told allies what they wish to hear, calculating that a little loose rhetoric is surely less harmful than * This article was written as part of an Australian Research Council project (LP0883246). 1 See e.g. Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, 'The logic of zero: toward a world without nuclear weapons ', Foreign Affairs 87: 6, Nov.-Dec. 2008, pp. 80-95.

This article examines the extent to which terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons poses a tangible threat to international security. In the literature on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) some analysts have tended to exaggerate the scope of the threat and assumed that large-scale terrorist acts involving WMD are only 'a matter of time'. In short, there is a tendency among observers to converge on analogous assessments at the higher end of the threat spectrum. In this article I argue that although WMD terrorism remains a real prospect, the ease with which such attacks can be carried out has been exaggerated; acquiring WMD capabilities for delivery against targets is a lot more problematic for terrorists than is generally acknowledged in the literature. However, this is not to say that the possibility of such attacks can (or should) be ruled out. The rise of a 'new' brand of terrorism that operates across transnational networks and whose operations aim to inflict mass casualties, coupled with the destructive threshold crossed on 11 September 2001, mean that terrorist attacks using WMD will continue to be a realistic prospect in the future.

No abstract

No abstract