Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?

Abstract

Nuclear weapons have lost none of their capacity to stir serious debate among scholars and policy-makers. Despite the passage of time since the Cold War-a period during which the harsh reality of mutual assured destruction pervaded relations between the superpowers-there remains a wide gulf dividing both policy-makers and non-government experts over what the appropriate role for nuclear weapons should be in the twenty-first century. This debate has ebbed and flowed over the past two decades and has been characterized by surges of optimism from those who believe nuclear weapons will be consigned to the dustbin of history in the near future and matching surges of pessimism from those who maintain that nuclear weapons will always be with us.In recent discussions, significant attention has focused on the issue of nuclear deterrence and the closely related question of whether security guarantees from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states involving the possible use of nuclear weapons have a place in the twenty-first-century global strategic landscape. While some have sought to highlight what they see as the continuing utility of extended nuclear deterrence, other contributors to the literature remain sceptical that it has a role to play in stabilizing strategic relationships among states. Some, indeed, argue that extended nuclear deterrence constitutes a major obstacle to reducing the salience of nuclear weapons worldwide. According to this perspective, by reifying nuclear deterrence as a dimension of the security guarantees that lie at the heart of its alliance networks, the United States is effectively blocking progress towards bringing the number of nuclear weapons down to levels where complete disarmament can become a feasible option for policymakers. 1 Others have even claimed that, given doubts about whether any US administration would actually consider employing nuclear weapons in situations other than when American territory is threatened directly by a nuclear-armed adversary, extended deterrence is merely a rhetorical device designed to shore up alliances. As one leading expert has observed, 'there is no such thing as "the nuclear umbrella" … one US administration after the other has told allies what they wish to hear, calculating that a little loose rhetoric is surely less harmful than * This article was written as part of an Australian Research Council project (LP0883246). 1 See e.g. Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, 'The logic of zero: toward a world without nuclear weapons ', Foreign Affairs 87: 6, Nov.-Dec. 2008, pp. 80-95.

Investigating nuclear-armed North Korea's “strategic” challenge and options for the United States and South Korea

“…Scholars called this "deterrence by punishment" (Snyder, 1961, pp. 14-16), which is based on the belief that the higher the potential cost of war, the greater the incentive to avoid it (O'Neil, 2011(O'Neil, , p. 1441. To realize this concept, the United States and the Soviet Union designed their nuclear deterrence strategy to conduct more painful retaliation (the second strike) if the enemy attacks (the first strike).…”

Prospects for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation: 70 Years after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bombings

“…First of all, certain empirical cases prove the concept of extended nuclear deterrence to be inefficient. Indeed, if we refer to the US extended nuclear deterrence policy in South-East Asia, we can see that it has been ineffective in deterring North Korea from militarily provoking South Korea and escalating tensions in this region (sinking of South Korean boats and shelling South Korean islands) 28 . Secondly, the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence does not match the credibility of extended conventional deterrence.…”

“…Moreover, nuclear powers seem more inclined to resort to conventional weapons if the use of force is needed. One can take the example of China, and observe how it resorts only to the use of its conventional forces rather than its nuclear weapons to advance its national interests in the South China Sea 55 . More immediately, Russia and China's nuclear weapons aim at equalizing the imbalance in conventional forces with the United States, but it is unclear what kind of threats these nuclear weapons are supposed to deter 56 .…”

“…27 Furthermore, as of April 2015 MEPhI signed the cooperation agreements on development of joint master degree programs with 3 universities of Turkey. 28 According to Kumbaroğlu, since Turkey does not currently have the needed know-how for the construction phase and supply of material for the reactors, Turkish companies can be expected to contribute to standard construction works, which will not lead to a transfer of knowhow. However in the long term Turkey expects to transfer nuclear know-how through the training of these Turkish students.…”

Analisis Pengaruh Kebijakan Extended Deterrence Dalam Aliansi Amerika Serikat-Korea Selatan Terhadap Stabilitas Keamanan Di Asia Timur

“…Salah satu kebijakan yang terdapat dalam kebijakan tersebut yaitu Extended Deterrence yang pada dasarnya ditujukan untuk permasalahan nuklir Korea Utara, selain itu juga Extended Deterrence ini memiliki tujuan agar tidak terjadi konflik atau peperangan secara militeristik dengan skala yang besar di antara kedua negara Korea. Selama beberapa dekade, senjata nuklir telah menjadi elemen utama dalam urusan internasional di kawasan Asia Timur, senjata nuklir sendiri menjadi landasan sistem ancaman bipolar yang kaku berdasarkan pada pencegahan strategis dan terorganisir di seputaran keseimbangan teror global dan sudah menjadi hal yang biasa jika senjata nuklir dijadikan sebagai sebuah proyeksi ancaman terutama di kawasan Asia Timur (O'Neill, 2011).…”