Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction: How serious is the threat?

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons poses a tangible threat to international security. In the literature on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) some analysts have tended to exaggerate the scope of the threat and assumed that large-scale terrorist acts involving WMD are only 'a matter of time'. In short, there is a tendency among observers to converge on analogous assessments at the higher end of the threat spectrum. In this article I argue that although WMD terrorism remains a real prospect, the ease with which such attacks can be carried out has been exaggerated; acquiring WMD capabilities for delivery against targets is a lot more problematic for terrorists than is generally acknowledged in the literature. However, this is not to say that the possibility of such attacks can (or should) be ruled out. The rise of a 'new' brand of terrorism that operates across transnational networks and whose operations aim to inflict mass casualties, coupled with the destructive threshold crossed on 11 September 2001, mean that terrorist attacks using WMD will continue to be a realistic prospect in the future.

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Degrading and Managing Risk: Assessing Australia's Counter-Terrorist Strategy

“…The twin shocks in 1995 of the Oklahoma City bombing by a US militia group and the botched sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway by the well-resourced Aum Shinrikyo cult appeared to underscore the reality that modern terrorists were less concerned about sending a political message, and more focused on killing as many innocent people as possible in their attacks (see Hoffman 2006;Chalk 1999;Cronin 2002-03;Stern 2003). This perception stoked widespread concern-some justified, some clearly exaggerated-about whether 'new' terrorists would eventually avail themselves of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons for use in mass casualty attacks on major urban centres (for an overview of the debates, see O'Neil 2003). The increased attention devoted to suicide terrorism has largely been a consequence of recent high profile attacks (9/11, the first Bali attack in October 2002, the July 2005 London bombings), but has also reflected and reinforced long-standing concerns over mass casualty terrorism (Pape 2005, 8 -24).…”

Preparing Communities for Nuclear Terrorism

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