Figure 1: The electrostatic potential pictured for the first molecule, 2-amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene, is incorrect. (It corresponds to the highest energy stereostructure found in the Supporting Information.) The electrostatic potential for the lowest energy stereostructure (which is correctly depicted in ball-and-stick form) shows maximum negative potential on the nitro group ortho to methyl. All discussion of this molecule in the text remains correct.

Abstract:Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

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explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by tor egil førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. this pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.1. Jeroen van Bouwel is a postdoctoral fellow of the research fund (fWo), flanders (Belgium). the authors would like to thank Brian fay and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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