Abstract:Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.
Currently, next to the major classes, cyclic depsipeptides beauvericin and enniatins are also positioned as mycotoxins. However, as there are hundreds more fungal cyclic depsipeptides already identified, should these not be considered as mycotoxins as well? The current status of the mycotoxin definition revealed a lack of consistency, leading to confusion about what compounds should be called mycotoxins. Because this is of pivotal importance in risk assessment prioritization, a clear and quantitatively expressed mycotoxin definition is proposed, based on data of widely accepted mycotoxins. Finally, this definition is applied to a set of fungal cyclic depsipeptides, revealing that some of these should indeed be considered as mycotoxins.
In the traditional philosophical debate over different conceptual analyses of "disease," it is often presupposed that "disease" is univocally definable and that there are clear boundaries which distinguish this univocal category "disease" from the category of "nondisease." In this paper, I will argue for a shift in the discussion on the concept of "disease" and propose an alternative, pragmatic approach that is based on the conviction that "disease" is not a theoretical concept but a practical term. I develop a view on which our use of the term "disease" is determined by two interacting factors, namely, value-laden considerations about the (un)desirabilty of certain states and discoveries of cause(s) which is/are explanatorily relevant. I show how these factors interact with regard to a taxonomy of kinds of diseases. This pragmatic approach will not lead me to a final definition of "disease," but will result in a more realistic description of the way we build, use, apply, and change our concept of "disease." Meanwhile, it is useful as a basis for critical reflection on disease-labeling in medicine.
The reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses have always been a major concern. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) reliability field trials yielded ambiguous results, with some diagnostic categories scoring well below par. We argue that the emphasis on the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses, which has dominated psychiatric nosology and guided the endeavor of improving the DSM in its consecutive editions, is misguided and lacks in structural validity. In this article, we defend a pragmatic view on psychiatric disease as the most fruitful approach to an understanding of what the categorical distinctions in the DSM (can) represent. Disorders in the DSM are descriptions of clinical pictures and do not necessarily correspond to an identified pathological substrate. Although this is a logical result of the nature of psychiatric disease, it bears important consequences. The various DSM disease categories are not uniform but should be regarded as representing different kinds of disorders, ranging from a separation from normal behavior based on practical grounds to the discrete kind of disorders envisioned by proponents of a strong realistic view. We argue that the explication of kinds of disorders outlined in this article provides interesting perspectives on the problems of reliability and validity that the DSM faces.
This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the "pragmatic approach to scientific explanation." We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.
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