A Pragmatist Defense of Non‐relativistic Explanatory Pluralism in History and Social Science

Bouwel, Jeroen Van; Weber, Erik

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00445.x

Cited by 35 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…This does not contradict Skocpol's principle: they are different but compatible claims about factors that occur in the causal ancestry of all social revolutions (see also Van Bouwel & Weber 2008). …”

Section: Unification As An Explanatory Virtuementioning

confidence: 87%

The Role of Unification in Explanations of Facts

Weber

Bouwel

Lefevere

2011

EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009

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Section: Unification As An Explanatory Virtuementioning

confidence: 87%

The Role of Unification in Explanations of Facts

Weber

Bouwel

Lefevere

2011

EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009

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“…They can also try to provide guidelines for improving an explanatory practice. Examples of this can be found in Weber (2008a) and(2008b) and in De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel (2010). These papers engage in debates on explanatory practices in the social sciences and in the biomedical sciences.…”

Section: Context-dependent Normative Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Study Scientific Explanation?

Weber

Vreese

Bouwel

2013

SpringerBriefs in Philosophy

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This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the "pragmatic approach to scientific explanation." We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it. KeywordsCarnap, explanation, explication, Hempel, Kitcher, Salmon.1 T h e a u t h o r s t h a n k R a o u l G e r v a i s , M e r e l L e f e v e r e a n d t h e a u d i e n c e o f t h e 3 r d S P S P c o n f e r e n c e i n E x e t e r f o r t h e i r c o m m e n t s o n t h i s p a p e r . T h e r e s e a r c h f o r t h i s p a p e r w a s s u p p o r t e d b y t h e R e s e a r c h F o u n d a t i o n F l a n d e r s ( F W O ) t h r o u g h r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t G . 0 0 3 1 . 0 9 . 2 HOW TO STUDY SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION?

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“…History has proven that reductive explanations are often very useful in view of preventive measures and treatment decisions in medicine. 7 Without all this knowledge, medicine would not have been so powerful in preventing and treating diseases as it is today.…”

Section: Explanatory Pluralism In the Medical Sciences: Elaboration Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: Theory and practice

2010

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Abstract:Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

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A Pragmatist Defense of Non‐relativistic Explanatory Pluralism in History and Social Science

Cited by 35 publications

References 3 publications

The Role of Unification in Explanations of Facts

The Role of Unification in Explanations of Facts

How to Study Scientific Explanation?

Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: Theory and practice

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