Identifying the causes of accidents is a necessary prerequisite for preventive action. Some research suggests however that the analysis of accidents does not only differ between experts and laymen but that it is also linked to certain characteristics inherent in the analyst and in the social group to which he belongs: beliefs, value systems, norms, experiences in common, attitudes, roles, social and technical practices, etc. Culturally determined bias seems to affect the perception of risk and the causes of accidents. This article presents a certain number of thoughts and results based upon research camed out on causal attributions of traffic accidents in The Ivory Coast (West Africa) and discusses the importance of culture in risk-taking and accident prevention. It shows in particular that fatalistic beliefs and mystical practices influence the perception of accidents and consequently incite one to take more risks and neglect safety measures.

The two studies reported here confirmed the role of the attributor's hierarchical level in causal attributions about accidents in different types of organizations. In both studies, supervisors vs. subordinates had to analyze a minor work accident vs. a serious one. The first study used male vs. female subjects, whereas the second compared the target's position in the same (in‐group) vs. different (out‐group) hierarchical level as the attributor. In all cases, more internal attributions than external ones were given to explain the accident. These results demonstrate a tendency toward defensive attribution, whereby people tend to protect themselves or their group from blame or prejudice (Shaver, 1970a). This self‐protective attribution bias was found to increase with accident severity, particularly in Study 2. The conclusion offers some suggestions for accident analysis and prevention.

a b s t r a c tThis article examines the relationship between safety climate, risk perception and involvement in safety management by first-line managers (FLM). Sixty-three FLMs from two French nuclear plants answered a questionnaire measuring perceived workplace safety climate, perceived risk, and involvement in safety management. We hypothesized that a positive perception of safety climate would promote substantial involvement in safety management, and that this effect would be stronger than the perceived-risk effect. We also expected that safety climate dimensions would have a different impact on involvement in safety management. Especially, we expected climate dimensions dealing with safety-related exchanges between managers and their supervisees to be more related to FLMs' involvement in safety management. As expected, perceived risk, as well as safety climate, was related to FLMs' involvement in safety management: the more they perceived risks as probable and serious for their supervisees, the more involved they got in safety management. Similarly, FLMs who perceived a good safety climate in their company reported getting more involved in safety management than did FLMs who perceived a poor safety climate. Moreover, the results showed that safety climate was the key variable because it completely mediated the effect of perceived risk on involvement in safety management. Another important result showed that immediate supervisor encouragement was more influential than senior management views on safety. Furthermore, the fact of being called upon by supervisees on safety issues prompted the FLMs to be more involved in safety management. Possible avenues for improving the involvement of FLMs in safety management are suggested.

This study clarifies the associations between accident history, perception of the riskiness of road travel and traffic safety behaviours by taking into account the number and severity of accidents experienced. A sample of 525 road users in Cameroon answered a questionnaire comprising items on perception of risk, safe behaviour and personal accident history. Participants who reported involvement in more than three accidents or involvement in a severe accident perceived road travel as less risky and also reported behaving less safely compared with those involved in fewer, or less severe accidents. The results have practical implications for the prevention of traffic accidents. Practitioner Summary: The associations between accident history, perceived risk of road travel and safe behaviour were investigated using self-report questionnaire data. Participants involved in more than three accidents, or in severe accidents, perceived road travel as less risky and also reported more unsafe behaviour compared with those involved in fewer, or less severe accidents. Campaigns targeting people with a less serious, less extensive accident history should aim to increase awareness of hazards and the potential severity of their consequences, as well as emphasising how easy it is to take the recommended preventive actions. Campaigns targeting those involved in more frequent accidents, and survivors of serious accidents, should address feelings of invulnerability and helplessness.

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RÉSUMÉ Les situations à risque sont par excellence des situations caractérisées par de l’incertitude. L’un des buts des actions de sécurité, c’est justement de minimiser cette incertitude et de rendre ces situations plus ou moins prévisibles ou plus ou moins maîtrisables. La maîtrise des risques passe par leur évaluation et par l’explication des situations accidentogènes. Face à l’incertitude, l’évaluation des risques et l’explication des accidents sont dominées par les représentations et les croyances des différents acteurs. Du fait de la complexité des situations qui génèrent de l’incertitude, ces croyances conduisent à des inférences et des conclusions causales parfois erronées ou biaisées. Ces biais ou illusions conduisent à des fausses certitudes qui peuvent être préjudiciables à la sécurité. La connaissance de ces croyances illusoires peut être utile pour influencer positivement les comportements en faveur d’une meilleure sécurité.

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