Although the concept of regional power is frequently used in International Relations (IR) literature, there is no consensus regarding the defining characteristics of a regional power. The article discusses different theoretical approaches that address the topic of power hierarchies in international politics and make reference to the concept of regional power. Marking differences as well as common ground with the more traditional concept of ‘middle powers’, the article outlines an analytical concept of regional powers adequate for contemporary IR research. The analytical dimensions of the framework may be employed to differentiate regional powers from other states and to compare regional powers with regard to their power status or relative power. Furthermore, the article investigates the possible repercussions of the rise of regional powers for international politics and discusses the probable importance and functions of regional governance structures for regional powers

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has positioned itself as a regional security organization aimed at reducing the influence of the Organization of American States (OAS) in South America. At the same time, the OAS paradoxically serves as a model for UNASUR because of its operational capacity and its legitimacy as a regional organization. This article analyzes the seemingly contradictory tendencies of replication and dissociation that UNASUR exhibits towards the OAS in terms of security conceptions and practices. In the first part of the paper, we will draw on recent debates on international regime complexity to develop a framework to study institutional overlap. The second part analyzes to what extent and in which respects UNASUR, and particularly its Defense Council, overlaps with the OAS in terms of security conceptions and practices, while the third part examines the causes of the emergence of a "competitor" for the OAS in South America.

No abstract

No abstract

ResumenEl artículo enfoca la paradoja de que el sistema político chileno ha funcionado satisfactoriamente, a pesar de combinar rasgos que, según la literatura científica, deberían crear inestabilidad. Se lleva a cabo un análisis de las relaciones de poder entre el Congreso y el Presidente para esbozar los rasgos específicos de la separación horizontal de poderes en Chile, enfatizando, sobre todo, en los elementos que han contribuido a la estabilidad del sistema político. En la parte final, se discute desde un enfoque más amplio sobre el aporte específico del Congreso a la consolidación de la democracia chilena. Se concluye planteando que el parlamento ha logrado una institucionalización horizontal bastante exitosa, pero que en la percepción de los ciudadanos no ha logrado una institucionalización vertical satisfactoria. AbstractThe article focuses on the paradox that the Chilean political system has funcioned satisfactorily despite the fact that it combines characteristics which in the scholarly literature are held to be leading to instability. On this background, the author analizes the relations of power between Congress and President, with special emphasis on those elements which have contributed to political stability. He then widens the focus to discuss the specific contributions the nation's Congress has made to the democratic consolidation of Chile. He concludes that the Chilean parliament has been quite sucessful in regard to horizontal institutionalization whereas -according to a widespread perception of Chile's citizens-it still shows many deficiencies in regard to its vertical institutionalization.

This article investigates whether the overlapping of intergovernmental regional organizations in Latin America with regard to membership and mandate is harmful or beneficial to regional cooperation (with a special focus on mediation in domestic and international conflicts). The article begins by systematizing the discussion about the possible risks and potential benefits of overlapping regional organizations, and then outlines hypotheses that can be tested in concrete episodes of overlap of action. The article then analyzes nine episodes in which an overlap of action has occurred between two Latin American organizations, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The results of the study are mixed. However, the effects of overlapping seem to be much less problematic than a large body of literature generally assumes.

On 22June 2012, President Fernando Lugo of Paraguay became the 16th president in a Latin American “third wave” democracy to not finish his term. Lugo was impeached in a hasty process approved by an overwhelming congressional majority. International reactions spearheaded by the South American left were condemnatory, labeling the impeachment an “institutional coup.” This article compares the Lugo impeachment to the other presidential breakdowns in Latin America, and discusses how the procedures used to remove a president vary. It is argued that the procedures by which presidents fall should guide how international society reacts to presidential and democratic crises.

South America features a very particular regional architecture, one which is characterised by the proliferation and overlapping of regional organisations, with UNASUR at the centre. UNASUR is an intergovernmental organisation with no supranational institutions. The article will argue that institutional flexibility, which is both a core element of South American regionalism and a specific institutional feature of UNASUR, corresponds with the key interests of the founding members of this organisation. Based on this assumption, the article will analyse the strategies and policies of the various Argentinean governments during the period when UNASUR was created (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008). It will differentiate between a 'uniaxial' regional integration approach structured around one thematic axis and a 'multiaxial' approach evolving along multiple axes in parallel; it will also ask to what extent the new regional architecture corresponds to the core interests of that country. For the Argentinean government, it was important to ensure that UNASUR would not constrain its foreign policy options. The result was the variable geometry codified in the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty.