This study explains the challenges associated with the Heckman (1979) procedure to control for selection bias, assesses the quality of its application in accounting research, and offers guidance for better implementation of selection models. A survey of 75 recent accounting articles in leading journals reveals that many researchers implement the technique in a mechanical way with relatively little appreciation of important econometric issues and problems surrounding its use. Using empirical examples motivated by prior research, we illustrate that selection models are fragile and can yield quite literally any possible outcome in response to fairly minor changes in model specification. We conclude with guidance on how researchers can better implement selection models that will provide more convincing evidence on potential selection bias, including the need to justify model specifications and careful sensitivity analyses with respect to robustness and multicollinearity. Data Availability: Data used are available from public sources identified in the study.

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In this synthesis we review research on going-concern modified audit opinions (GCOs) and develop a framework to categorize this research. We identify three major areas of research: (1) determinants of GCOs that include client factors, auditor factors, auditor-client relationships, and other environmental factors; (2) accuracy of GCOs; and (3) consequences arising from GCOs. We identify method-related considerations for researchers working in the area and identify future research opportunities.

Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that a change of partner is bad for audit quality, as it results in a loss of client-specific knowledge. On the other hand, proponents argue that a change of partner is beneficial, as it results in a positive peer review effect and a fresh perspective on the audit. We test the impact of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality using a unique dataset of audit adjustments in China. Our results suggest that mandatory rotation of engagement partners results in higher quality audits in the years immediately surrounding rotation. Specifically, we find a significantly higher frequency of audit adjustments during the departing partner's final year of tenure prior to mandatory rotation and during the incoming partner's first year of tenure following mandatory rotation.

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