To explore brain areas involved in basic numerical computation, functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) scanning was performed on college students during performance of three tasks; simple arithmetic, numerical magnitude judgment, and a perceptual-motor control task. For the arithmetic relative to the other tasks, results for all eight subjects revealed bilateral activation in Brodmann's area 44, in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (areas 9 and 10), in inferior and superior parietal areas, and in lingual and fusiform gyri. Activation was stronger on the left for all subjects, but only at Brodmann's area 44 and the parietal cortices. No activation was observed in the arithmetic task in several other areas previously implicated for arithmetic, including the angular and supramarginal gyri and the basal ganglia. In fact, angular and supramarginal gyri were significantly deactivated by the verification task relative to both the magnitude judgment and control tasks for every subject. Areas activated by the magnitude task relative to the control were more variable, but in five subjects included bilateral inferior parietal cortex. These results confirm some existing hypotheses regarding the neural basis of numerical processes, invite revision of others, and suggest productive lines for future investigation.

No abstract

The authors utilized repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) in 16 normal volunteers to investigate the role of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) in analogic reasoning. rTMS over the left and right PFC, over the left motor cortex, and sham stimulation over the left PFC were administered during memory and analogic reasoning conditions. rTMS over the left PFC led to a significant reduction in response times only in the analogy condition without affecting accuracy. These results indicate that the left PFC is relevant for analogic reasoning and that rTMS applied to the PFC can speed up solution time.

No abstract

Remote analogical reminding is hypothesized to occur when one episode is cued by another sharing similar themes but not similar object, character, or event descriptions. Wereport three experiments exploring this view. Subjects' remindings in Experiment 1 showed sensitivity to remote analogical similarity even though targets were encoded only briefly in an incidental learning paradigm. Experiment 2 subjects showed reliable remindings of remote analogs with study-test delays of up to 1 week. Experiment 3 demonstrated that remote analogical reminding effects are not an artifact of subjects' editing nonanalogical remindings. All experiments supported the hypothesis that human memory is sensitive to remote analogical similarity. We discuss the implications of these findings for memory models. Future progress requires the development of formal models that quantify factors relevant to reminding performance, such as reminding interference, transfer-appropriate processing, and domain expertise.Intelligent access to knowledge in long-term memory, for people or computers, can depend on sensitivity to similarity solely at the level of inferred plans,

An intriguing finding in the hypothesis-testing literature concerns a large increase in the proportion of subjects who discover a rule when they are asked to determine two rules rather than that rule alone. This finding is based on Wason's (1960) “2 4 6” task, in which subjects try to discover a rule (ascending numbers) by generating and testing number triples. They are initially given an example (“2, 4, 6”) of the rule that leads to overly specific hypotheses. With single-goal (SG) instructions, subjects try to discover the correct rule and are told whether each triple proposed fits the rule. With dual-goal (DG) instructions, correct and incorrect categories are labelled, respectively, as DAX and MED. Subjects try to discover both rules and are told whether each proposed triple is DAX or MED. Two explanations of why DG subjects do better at rule discovery than SG subjects are tested: the quantity of information and the testing of complementary rules using the prevalent positive-test strategy. Results support the latter explanation: DG subjects outperform SG subjects only if they know the rules are complementary, and that SG subjects’ performance does not improve when required to test more triples before announcing their first rule. A third explanation, the positivity of the linguistic label of the feedback, is ruled out. Understanding the superiority of DG instructions might suggest a general method for enhancing rule discovery.

No abstract

No abstract