This chapter provides a methodological case for maintaining classical logic even in the face of the semantic paradoxes. It advocates an abductive methodology for choosing, or adjudicating, logics (or, more specifically, logical theories), and notes that the semantic paradoxes constitute promising grounds for an abductive critique of classical logic. As the chapter notes, there is a strong prima facie abductive case for classical logic. This is not due to a principle of conservativism. It does not appeal to the benefits of familiarity with classical logic or the costs of changing the logic. It concerns, rather, intrinsic features of classical logic, such as its simplicity and strength. The chapter concludes that classical logic is doing fine by ordinary criteria and has no need for further justification, so we should keep it.

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In this article, I provide a general account of deflationism. After doing so, I turn to truth‐deflationism, where, after first describing some of the species, I highlight some challenges for those who wish to adopt it.

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This chapter investigates the question of when it is reasonable to replace an inconsistent concept. After surveying a number of proposals for how one might understand constitutive principles, it goes on to endorse Burgess’s (2004) account of being pragmatically analytic, as a possible source of insight into constitutive principles. The chapter then raises a question: If truth is an inconsistent concept, does it need to be replaced? According to the argument in the chapter, when an inconsistent concept paralyzes valuable projects, it is time to replace it. And if we are to replace a concept, our replacement should be able to do the work that the inconsistency-yielding one did. This, of course, raises a fundamental question concerning what work the notion of truth does for us. The chapter mounts a case for the claim that inflationists, but not obvious deflationists, about truth should offer a replacement for the concept of truth.

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