Revising Inconsistent Concepts

Abstract

This chapter investigates the question of when it is reasonable to replace an inconsistent concept. After surveying a number of proposals for how one might understand constitutive principles, it goes on to endorse Burgess’s (2004) account of being pragmatically analytic, as a possible source of insight into constitutive principles. The chapter then raises a question: If truth is an inconsistent concept, does it need to be replaced? According to the argument in the chapter, when an inconsistent concept paralyzes valuable projects, it is time to replace it. And if we are to replace a concept, our replacement should be able to do the work that the inconsistency-yielding one did. This, of course, raises a fundamental question concerning what work the notion of truth does for us. The chapter mounts a case for the claim that inflationists, but not obvious deflationists, about truth should offer a replacement for the concept of truth.

The Liar Paradox: Between Evidence and Truth

“…First of all, the epistemic approach is a mixture of two incompatible views of logic: descriptive and revisionist. The idea that classical logic deals with truth brings a revisionist component to the approach, given that classical logic and the classical notion of truth require a revision of naive concepts and restrictions that are set clearly in order to avoid paradoxes [again, one may have good reasons to be revisionist in this sense, see Williamson, 2017;Scharp and Shapiro, 2017]. On the other hand, there is a more descriptivist approach tied to paraconsistency.…”

“…So, the good news is that, by confining contradictions to a language or theory, one may somehow embrace the contradictions and deal with them using the resources of a paraconsistent logic, avoiding the explosion that would ensue from such contradiction. No need to look for conceptual revision to avoid the contradictions [see Scharp and Shapiro, 2017, on revising the notion of truth].…”

“…In other words, the problem with this treatment of the Liar is that it introduces a selective treatment of inconsistencies. The inconsistency of the Liar, given that it deals with the notion of truth, is deemed unacceptable, so it is quarantined and dealt with by a form of conceptual engineering, which re-elaborates it in order to ensure that classical logic applies [for further discussion on revising inconsistent concepts, see also Scharp and Shapiro, 2017]. Other contradictions, on the other hand, such as contradictions arising in empirical scientific theories, like the early model of the atom advanced by Bohr, or the inconsistency obtained when one brings together quantum mechanics and general relativity, for instance, are to be dealt with by a paraconsistent logic in terms of nonconclusive evidence.…”

How to Study Well-Being: A Proposal for the Integration of Philosophy With Science

“…Sometimes those purposes are abstract and theoretical. For instance, some philosophers seek to design a concept of “truth” that can perform certain logical functions (Scharp, 2013; Scharp & Shapiro, 2017). In other cases, the relevant purposes are practical ones.…”

The Problem with ‘the Background Logic Problem’

“…That is, in the measure that such desiderata involve logical concepts, they are also judged from 7 Which ones, is a matter for discussion elsewhere, but see Hjortland (2019) for the difficulties of using non-evidential factors in logical theory selection. 8 See, for instance Scharp -Shapiro (2017) for a discussion on conceptual revision involving truth in the light of paradoxes. the theoretical apparatus of the received logic (for the classical logician), and they do not gain much purchase from that point of view.…”