Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists?

Beall, Jc; Armour‐Garb, Bradley

doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00440

Cited by 82 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Beall and Armour‐Garb (: 303), Priest (: 45), and Read (: 9, 13) allege that restrictionism is ad hoc. Restrictionists tell us to accept many T‐biconditionals but to reject some others.…”

Section: Which T‐biconditionals To Deny?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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In Defence of Radical Restrictionism

Liggins

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists-as I will call proponents of the strategy-respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema

is true iff p.My aim is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. I will argue that, whilst cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes.

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Section: Which T‐biconditionals To Deny?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The third objection to the combination of deflationism and restrictionism is that the strategy of repelling paradox by denying T‐biconditionals is ad hoc (Beall and Armour‐Garb : 304, Priest : 45). We are told to accept many T‐biconditionals but to reject some others.…”

Section: Restrictionism's Relation To Deflationism Inconsistency Thementioning

confidence: 99%

In Defence of Radical Restrictionism

Liggins

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Horwich's choice, to restrict what counts as a correct instance of the truth-schema, faces various serious charges: namely ad hocery, loss of expressive power, and theoretical instability. Simmons (1999) and Beall and Armour-Garb (2003) argued that deflationists owe us an account of the grounds on which the truth-schema is restricted, but that, in its absence, the restriction is ad hoc and unjustified. In the absence of a justification, the restriction of the schema entails a significant loss of expressibility, and the inability to explain why certain prima facie paradoxical sentences are paradoxical.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the absence of a justification, the restriction of the schema entails a significant loss of expressibility, and the inability to explain why certain prima facie paradoxical sentences are paradoxical. As an alternative, Beall and Armour-Garb (2003) suggest, deflationism should accept a revision of logic and embrace dialetheism. Simmons (1999) advocates a contextualist approach to 'true' that at first sight is not available to minimalists, since it is formulated for sentences as primary truth-bearers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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This is not an instance of (E)

Marques

2016

Synthese

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Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the liar sentence expresses a proposition, but he endorses the denial that the liar is an acceptable instance of the equivalence schema (E). This paper has two main parts. It first shows that Horwich's preferred denial is also problematic. As Simmons (1999), Beall and Armour-Garb (2003), and Asay (2015) argued, the solution is ad hoc, faces a possible loss of expressibility, and is ultimately unstable. Finally, the paper explores a different combination of possibilities for minimalism: treating the truth-predicate as context-dependent, rejecting the notion that the liar expresses a proposition, and reinterpreting negation in some contexts as metalinguistic denial. The paper argues that these are preferable options, but signposts possible dangers ahead.

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Anti-exceptionalism and methodological pluralism in logic

Tajer

2022

Synthese

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According to methodological anti-exceptionalism, logic follows a scientific methodology. There has been some discussion about which methodology logic has. Authors such as Priest, Hjortland and Williamson have argued that logic can be characterized by an abductive methodology. We choose the logical theory that behaves better under a set of epistemic criteria (such as fit to data, simplicity, fruitfulness, or consistency). In this paper, I analyze some important discussions in the philosophy of logic (intuitionism versus classical logic, semantic paradoxes, and the meaning of conditionals), and I show that they presuppose different methodologies, involving different notions of evidence and different epistemic values. I argue that, rather than having a specific methodology such as abductivism, logic can be characterized by methodological pluralism. This position can also be seen as the application of scientific pluralism to the realm of logic.

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Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists?

Cited by 82 publications

References 36 publications

In Defence of Radical Restrictionism

In Defence of Radical Restrictionism

This is not an instance of (E)

Anti-exceptionalism and methodological pluralism in logic

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