Judicial sentencing decisions should be guided by facts, not by chance. The present research however demonstrates that the sentencing decisions of experienced legal professionals are influenced by irrelevant sentencing demands even if they are blatantly determined at random. Participating legal experts anchored their sentencing decisions on a given sentencing demand and assimilated toward it even if this demand came from an irrelevant source (Study 1), they were informed that this demand was randomly determined (Study 2), or they randomly determined this demand themselves by throwing dice (Study 3). Expertise and experience did not reduce this effect. This sentencing bias appears to be produced by a selective increase in the accessibility of arguments that are consistent with the random sentencing demand: The accessibility of incriminating arguments was higher if participants were confronted with a high rather than a low anchor (Study 4). Practical and theoretical implications of this research are discussed.

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In the current psychological debate, low replicability of psychological findings is a central topic. While the discussion about the replication crisis has a huge impact on psychological research, we know less about how it impacts public trust in psychology. In this article, we examine whether low replicability damages public trust and how this damage can be repaired. Studies 1–3 provide correlational and experimental evidence that low replicability reduces public trust in psychology. Additionally, Studies 3–5 evaluate the effectiveness of commonly used trust-repair strategies such as information about increased transparency (Study 3), explanations for low replicability (Study 4), or recovered replicability (Study 5). We found no evidence that these strategies significantly repair trust. However, it remains possible that they have small but potentially meaningful effects, which could be detected with larger samples. Overall, our studies highlight the importance of replicability for public trust in psychology.

In the legal systems of most western countries, defense attorneys present their sentencing recommendation after the prosecution has presented its sentencing demands. This procedural sequence for criminal cases is intended to balance the impact of both parties on the judge's final decision. Especially the positioning of the defense's plea at the end of the trial follows the fundamental legal principle "in dubio pro reo." Research on judgmental anchoring, however, suggests that the standard procedural sequence may in fact work against this principle. Consistent with this implication, the present studies demonstrate that the defense's sentencing recommendation is anchored on, and consequently assimilated toward, the preceding recommendation by the prosecution. This influence prevents the defense attorney from effectively counterbalancing the prosecutor's demand. Instead, the biased defense attorney's recommendation partially mediates the impact of the prosecutor's demand on the judge's decision. These findings suggest that the standard procedural sequence in court may place the defense at a distinct disadvantage.

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The present research examines whether anchoring effects-the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard-depend on judges' available knowledge in the target domain. Based on previous research, I distinguish two types of anchoring effects. Standard anchoring is obtained if judges are explicitly asked to compare the anchor to the target. Basic anchoring results if the accessibility of the anchor is increased prior to judgments about the target. I expected that only basic but not standard anchoring is reduced by providing judges with judgment-relevant knowledge. Using a standard versus basic anchoring paradigm, 112 participants were confronted with a high versus low anchor before estimating the average price of a German midsize car. Prior to this task, participants were provided with information about prices of cars (relevant knowledge) versus kitchens (irrelevant knowledge). Results demonstrate that this knowledge only influenced the magnitude of basic but not standard anchoring effects. This finding demonstrates that knowledge has differential effects in different types of anchoring.

This article presents an integrative review of recent research on anchoring effects in the courtroom as one example for the strong impact of representation norms on sentencing decisions. Anchoring effects – the assimilation of numerical judgments to a given standard – have been demonstrated in many judgmental domains. Even sentencing decisions are subject to anchoring effects. In court proceedings this gives disproportionate weight to the prosecutor, whose sentencing demand serves as an anchor. The prosecution's sentencing demand even affects defense attorneys, who assimilate their own sentencing recommendation to it. This influence seems to remain outside of defense attorneys’ awareness. Expertise does not attenuate this bias. Accordingly, defendants might be better off if defense attorneys could make their final case prior to the prosecutor's case.