The United Nations have described the outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) as the worst global crisis since the second world war. Behavioral protective measures, such as good hand hygiene and social distancing, may strongly affect infection and fatality rates worldwide. In two studies (total N = 962), we aimed to identify central predictors of acceptance and adoption of protective measures, including sociodemographic variables, risk perception, and trust. We found that men and younger participants show lower acceptance and adoption of protective measures, suggesting that it is crucial to develop targeted health messages for these groups. Moreover, trust in politics and trust in science emerged as important predictors for the acceptance and adoption of protective measures. These results show that maintaining and ideally strengthening trust in politics and trust in science might be central for overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic.

The United Nations have described the outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) as the worst global crisis since the second world war. Behavioral protective measures, such as good hand hygiene and social distancing, may strongly affect infection and fatality rates worldwide. In two studies (total N = 962), we aimed to identify central predictors of acceptance and adoption of protective measures, including sociodemographic variables, risk perception, and trust. We found that men and younger participants show lower acceptance and adoption of protective measures, suggesting that it is crucial to develop targeted health messages for these groups. Moreover, trust in politics and trust in science emerged as important predictors for the acceptance and adoption of protective measures. We discuss factors that contribute to the development of trust and derive implications for effective health communication during COVID-19.

In the current psychological debate, low replicability of psychological findings is a central topic. While the discussion about the replication crisis has a huge impact on psychological research, we know less about how it impacts public trust in psychology. In this article, we examine whether low replicability damages public trust and how this damage can be repaired. Studies 1–3 provide correlational and experimental evidence that low replicability reduces public trust in psychology. Additionally, Studies 3–5 evaluate the effectiveness of commonly used trust-repair strategies such as information about increased transparency (Study 3), explanations for low replicability (Study 4), or recovered replicability (Study 5). We found no evidence that these strategies significantly repair trust. However, it remains possible that they have small but potentially meaningful effects, which could be detected with larger samples. Overall, our studies highlight the importance of replicability for public trust in psychology.

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In three studies (N = 1,055), we investigated the determinants and consequences of the perception of infection risks during the early and later outbreak of COVID-19 in Germany. Individuals’ perceived COVID-19 infection risk was reasonably in line with experts’ assessment but changed over time. The probability of the rare event of getting severely sick and hospitalized was overestimated. Overestimation increased in the exponential growth phase of the pandemic and later on decreased again, showing an inverse U-shaped pattern. Individuals showed biases in their risk perception concerning overconfidence and the underestimation of exponential growth of infection cases in the early phase of the pandemic. Forecasts were more accurate after the growth curve had flattened. Risk perceptions increased with perceived dread and tended to increase with perceived control over infection, the evaluation of scientific and own knowledge about the pandemic. Approval for the introduction of stricter governmental measures and acceptance of future vaccination measures was mainly influenced by rational utilitarian factors of risk perception (probabilities and utilities of outcomes). These rational influences were mediated by dread, but dread had an additional potentially irrational effect. Adherence to governmental recommendations was mainly driven by dread and positive expected long-term consequences of the measures. To a smaller degree, adherence increased with perceived personal consequences of infection and decreased with negative expected short-term consequences of these measures. Implications for theory development are discussed and recommendations to handle virus outbreaks are derived.

Some people believe that their own health is rather malleable and can be changed (incremental theory), whereas other people believe that their health is relatively fixed (entity theory). Previous research suggests that individuals who hold a strong incremental theory of health have more positive health‐related attitudes and engage in more health‐promoting behaviors in everyday life. However, less is known about the interpersonal effects of an incremental theory of health. A strong incremental theory of health could have detrimental consequences, such as increasing blame and reducing social support towards others who are ill. To test this, two studies (Study 1: N = 433, Study 2: N = 397) were conducted in which implicit theories of health (incremental vs. entity) were experimentally manipulated, and participants were presented with vignettes describing individuals suffering from different illnesses. The dependent variables included blame, sympathy, outcome expectancy, and social support. Study 1 demonstrated that an incremental theory of health increased blame towards people suffering from an illness, regardless of whether a physical or mental illness was presented, and blame indirectly attenuated social support. Study 2 showed that an incremental theory increased outcome expectancy, which indirectly amplified social support. In sum, this research suggests that an incremental theory of health may decrease social support via blame, but increases in outcome expectancy may counteract this effect.

In the current psychological debate, low replicability of psychological findings is a central topic. While the discussion about the replication crisis has a huge impact on psychological research, we know less about how it impacts public trust in psychology. In this paper, we examine whether low replicability damages public trust and how this damage can be repaired. Studies 1, 2 and 3 provide correlational and experimental evidence that low replicability reduces public trust in psychology. Additionally, Studies 3, 4, and 5 evaluate the effectiveness of commonly used trust-repair strategies, such as information about increased transparency (Study 3), explanations for low replicability (Study 4), or recovered replicability (Study 5). We found no evidence that these strategies significantly repair trust. However, it remains possible that they have small but potentially meaningful effects, which could be detected with larger samples. Overall, our studies highlight the importance of replicability for public trust in psychology.

A growing number of psychological research findings are initially published as preprints. Preprints are not peer reviewed and thus did not undergo the established scientific quality-control process. Many researchers hence worry that these preprints reach nonscientists, such as practitioners, journalists, and policymakers, who might be unable to differentiate them from the peer-reviewed literature. Across five studies in Germany and the United States, we investigated whether this concern is warranted and whether this problem can be solved by providing nonscientists with a brief explanation of preprints and the peer-review process. Studies 1 and 2 showed that without an explanation, nonscientists perceive research findings published as preprints as equally credible as findings published as peer-reviewed articles. However, an explanation of the peer-review process reduces the credibility of preprints (Studies 3 and 4). In Study 5, we developed and tested a shortened version of this explanation, which we recommend adding to preprints. This explanation again allowed nonscientists to differentiate between preprints and the peer-reviewed literature. In sum, our research demonstrates that even a short explanation of the concept of preprints and their lack of peer review allows nonscientists who evaluate scientific findings to adjust their credibility perception accordingly. This would allow harvesting the benefits of preprints, such as faster and more accessible science communication, while reducing concerns about public overconfidence in the presented findings.