No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

Resumo: Este artigo teórico propõe referencial para a análise de políticas públicas caracterizadas por processos de longa duração e que incluem mudanças não-incrementais. Para tanto, o estudo parte do pressuposto que esse tipo de análise apresenta como dificuldade o fato de conjugar a influência de elementos de continuidade com momentos de ruptura, o conhecido dilema das Ciências Sociais entre Estrutura e Ação. Este artigo propõe solução para essa questão ao associar dois campos teóricos aparentemente contraditórios do institucionalismo: o Institucionalismo Histórico (IH) e o Institucionalismo da Escolha Racional (IER). O texto indica regras necessárias para uso combinado e emprega o marco teórico "Institutional Analysis and Development Framework" (IAD), de Elinor Ostrom, para detalhar o processo de análise. Como o marco analítico de Ostrom se destina à análise de recursos de uso comum, essa proposta torna-se especialmente relevante para problemas relacionados a exploração de petróleo, irrigação, recursos florestais, sistemas ecológicos, preservação de biodiversidade, cooperativas e pesca, entre outros. Palavras-chave: marco teórico, políticas públicas, neo-institucionalismo histórico e neo-institucionalismo da escolha racional.Abstract:This is a theoretical paper which proposes a framework for public policies analysis that features long-term processes and non-incremental changes. It assumes that this sort of analysis presents difficulty in combining the influence of continuity elements with moments of rupture, the well-known dilemma of Social Sciences between structure and action. This paper proposes a solution for this issue through associating two apparently contradictory theoretical fields of institutionalism -the Historical institutionalism (HI) and the institutionalism of Rational Choice (IER). The text indicates the conditions for combined use and employs the Elinor Ostrom´s theoretical framework "Institutional Analysis and Development Framework" (IAD) in order to detail the analysis. Since the Ostrom's framework aims the analysis of common-use resources, this proposal becomes especially relevant for problems related to oil exploration, irrigation, forest resources, ecological systems, biodiversity preservation, cooperatives, fishing, etc. Keywords: theoretical framework, public Policy, historical, neo-institutionalism, rational choice neo-institutionalism. (Thelen,1999(Thelen, , 2003 Mahoney&Thelen,2010

No abstract

Resumo Problematizando o ferramental do institucionalismo histórico, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo entender os determinantes da mudança das regras que pautam o setor de petróleo no Brasil. Assim, analisa o processo que originou a Lei do Petróleo de 1997 até o momento da aprovação do marco regulatório estabelecido em 2010, e mostra que tais mudanças ocorreram pela combinação de diversas dinâmicas institucionais: algumas levaram a rutpuras com o status quo, outras a movimentos incrementais, associados a processos de continuidade com retornos crescentes. O artigo contribui com a discussão institucionalista em dois pontos: primeiramente mostrando a articulação de vertentes institucionais que costumam ser aplicadas de forma isolada – a da continuidade e a do gradualismo; e, mais importante, atribui ênfase especial a elementos não institucionais que explicam as mudanças institucionais.

This paper examines changes in oil revenue management in the period from the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s to the new oil sector regulatory framework introduced in 2010. Grounded on a combination of the long-term view afforded by historical institutionalism and the tools for modelling agents' behaviour offered by rational choice institutionalism, it stresses the importance of ideas and associated interests in the policy outcome, considering stakeholder interaction in the process, the institutional framework, the new critical juncture, and the new domestic and international setting. The result indicates that the Brazilian oil policy follows the ideas path during the 1990s and 2000s, reflecting the dominant interests in each phase. As well, the domestic economic outlook was critical to determine the extent to which the government had to follow international agencies policy recommendations.

This article analyzes the Brazilian case of federal centralization of oil revenues, to show how jurisdictions’ preferences may direct federal dynamics through central federative mechanisms. The study uses historical and institutional approaches that explain continuity and change in territorial regimes. Specifically, we analyse the loss of discretionary power in the use of oil resources through the understanding whether and how these changes affected the approval of National Law 12858 in 2013, which determined that federal government, states, and municipalities should spend their share of oil revenues on education and health. We show the way subnational preferences affect federal policies, highlighting the importance of causality and context, both politically and institutionally, and indicating a return to a governability pattern that seemed to be buried with the economic stabilization plan of 1994.