52% Yes, a signiicant crisis 3% No, there is no crisis 7% Don't know 38% Yes, a slight crisis 38% Yes, a slight crisis 1,576 RESEARCHERS SURVEYED M ore than 70% of researchers have tried and failed to reproduce another scientist's experiments, and more than half have failed to reproduce their own experiments. Those are some of the telling figures that emerged from Nature's survey of 1,576 researchers who took a brief online questionnaire on reproducibility in research. The data reveal sometimes-contradictory attitudes towards reproduc-ibility. Although 52% of those surveyed agree that there is a significant 'crisis' of reproducibility, less than 31% think that failure to reproduce published results means that the result is probably wrong, and most say that they still trust the published literature. Data on how much of the scientific literature is reproducible are rare and generally bleak. The best-known analyses, from psychology 1 and cancer biology 2 , found rates of around 40% and 10%, respectively. Our survey respondents were more optimistic: 73% said that they think that at least half of the papers in their field can be trusted, with physicists and chemists generally showing the most confidence. The results capture a confusing snapshot of attitudes around these issues, says Arturo Casadevall, a microbiologist at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. "At the current time there is no consensus on what reproducibility is or should be. " But just recognizing that is a step forward, he says. "The next step may be identifying what is the problem and to get a consensus. "

Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.

In a globalized world, establishing successful cooperation between people from different nations is becoming increasingly important. We present results from a comprehensive investigation of crosssocietal cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas involving population-representative samples from six countries and identify crucial facilitators of and obstacles to cooperation. In interactions involving mutual knowledge about only the other players' nationalities, we demonstrate that people hold strong and transnationally shared expectations (i.e., stereotypes) concerning the cooperation level of interaction partners from other countries. These expectations are the strongest determinants of participant cooperation. Paradoxically, however, they turn out to be incorrect stereotypes that even correlate negatively with reality. In addition to erroneous expectations, participants' cooperation behavior is driven by (shared) social preferences that vary according to the interaction partner's nationality. In the cross-societal context, these social preferences are influenced by differences in wealth and ingroup favoritism, as well as effects of specific country combinations but not by spatial distance between nations.M any social interactions have the structure of a social dilemma, which is characterized by the fact that mutual cooperation-that is, completely transferring one's own resources to an interaction partner (or a group account)-would lead to a socially optimal outcome in that the sum of pay-offs for all persons involved is maximized. However, irrespective of the interaction partner's behavior, each individual person would be better off by defecting: that is, transferring no resources. Thus, mutual defection is the dominant strategy that should be chosen by rational money-maximizing agents (1). Still, cooperation has been observed even in fully anonymous one-shot social dilemmas (2) in which individuals interact only once, so that any selfish incentive to cooperate strategically is excluded. Specifically, it is impossible to cooperate with the aim to later profit from a good reputation (3) or reciprocity (2).Various factors have been identified that, in combination, could explain this puzzling finding. Individuals might have social preferences in that they value the outcome of others and gain utility from the absolute pay-off of other players or lose utility from inequality in pay-offs (4-6). Additionally, individuals might have specific expectations that the other player will cooperate as well (7,8). Social preferences and expectations might thereby be driven partially by similarity and kinship, in that individuals cooperate with genetically similar others to increase biological fitness of their own genotype and expect others to do the same (9, 10).In the present study, our key goal is to investigate the determinants of cooperation between people from different nations. Specifically, cooperation-related expectations and social preferences cannot only account for cooperation behavior in general. These expectations...