Although the notion of empiricism looms large in many histories of early modern philosophy, its origins are not well understood. This paper aims to shed light on them. It argues that the notion of empiricism which is used in many histories of early modern thought does not have early modern, pre-Kantian origins. It first appeared and became widely used in Germany during the last two decades of the eighteenth century, in the course of the early debates on Kant's Critical philosophy.The paper has seven sections. Section 1 locates the present inquiry within current debates on the historiography of early modern philosophy. Section 2 discusses Francis Bacon's notions of empirical philosopher, physician, and politician, in order to establish whether Bacon employs or adumbrates the standard historiographical notion of empiricism. Sections 3 to 5 compare the notions of empirical philosopher, physician, and politician that can be found in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century texts, alongside related notions (e.g. "experimental philosophy") and methodological stances, with the standard notion of empiricism. Having argued that none of those pre-Kantian notions anticipates the standard notion, I locate its origins in Kant's Critical works and the early debates on his philosophy in late eighteenth-century Germany (Section 6). Some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.The paper focuses on two geographical areas: Great Britain and Germany. The focus 2 on Great Britain is due to the alleged Baconian and British roots of the distinction between rationalism and empiricism (RED) and of the notion and movement of empiricism. The focus on Germany is due to what I will argue are the German origins of the standard notion of empiricism. BackgroundThroughout the twentieth century, most English histories of early modern philosophy followed a familiar narrative. 1 It can be summarized in six tenets: 1The main philosophical movements of the early modern period are empiricism and rationalism. 2The most important empiricists are Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The most important rationalists are Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. 3Empiricism can be characterized, in broadly epistemological terms, as the conjunction of two claims: first, all of our (humans') concepts derive from experience;second, all of our substantive knowledge can only be proven to be true a posteriori.Accordingly, empiricists deny that we have innate concepts and that we can have any substantive a priori knowledge. 2 By contrast, rationalists claim that we have innate concepts and that we can have some substantive a priori knowledge. 29 The aim of this paper is not to establish which, among the various notions of empiricism which can be found in the current literature, were employed or instantiated in the early modern period, but only to establish whether, as some upholders of the received narrative claim and their opponents deny, the standard, still widely used notion of empiricism has early modern origins.Second, one may think that, in addressing this question, the paper proceeds...
In the mid-seventeenth century a movement of self-styled experimental philosophers emerged in Britain. Originating in the discipline of natural philosophy amongst Fellows of the Royal Society of London, it soon spread to medicine and by the eighteenth century had impacted moral philosophy, political philosophy, and aesthetics. Early modern experimental philosophers gave epistemic priority to observation and experiment over theorising and speculation. They decried the use of hypotheses and systembuilding without recourse to experiment and, in some quarters, developed a philosophy of experiment. In the eighteenth century, the movement spread to the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Its important role in early modern philosophy was subsequently eclipsed by the widespread adoption of the Kantian historiography, which emphasised the distinction between rationalism and empiricism and had no place for early modern experimental philosophy.The re-emergence of interest in early modern experimental philosophy roughly coincided with the development of contemporary x-phi. There are some important similarities between the two.
Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: "Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object". In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula "truth is the agreement of cognition with its object" illustrates the meaning of the predicate "is true" and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.