Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth

Abstract

Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: "Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object". In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula "truth is the agreement of cognition with its object" illustrates the meaning of the predicate "is true" and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence.

The significance of Kant's mere thoughts

“…Although, note that the nominal definition is given only for cognitions, potentially leaving scope for a different definition of truth for mere thoughts. See also Vanzo (2010) for a discussion of what a nominal definition of truth gives us. 8 See Allais (2015); Allison (2004); Bird (2006); Stang (2014) for recent interpretations.…”

Lessons on Truth from Kant

“…It might be worthwhile to note that some commentators (e.g., Hanna : 227, 2004/13 and Vanzo : 166) identify Kant's idea of a “criterion” with his idea of a “real definition”.…”

“… For earlier works addressing Kant's discussion of truth in this section see, e.g., Prauss (), Van Cleve (), Sher (, , ), Hanna (), Rosenkoetter (), and Vanzo (). Different authors vary in their focus.…”

“…. [U]nlike most other predicates, 'is true' should not be expected to participate in some deep theory of that 6 For earlier works addressing Kant's discussion of truth in this section see, e.g., Prauss (1969), Van Cleve (1999), Sher (1999Sher ( , 2004Sher ( , 2016a, Hanna (2000), Rosenkoetter (2009), and Vanzo (2010). Different authors vary in their focus.…”

“…Following Kant, I will usually speak about cognitions and judgments, but what I say applies to other truth-bearers as well. (For views and discussions of Kant's notion of a truth-bearer see Hanna 2000;Vanzo 2010;and Tolley Forthcoming. ) But the last conclusion is not necessarily the right conclusion to draw from Kant's argument.…”