Abstract-In this paper, the problem of developing bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctions is studied. We model electricity double-sided auctions as dynamic systems and use Nash-Cournot strategies for the market participants (generating firms and load serving entities). Through simulation studies, we compare the efficiency and competitiveness of electricity double-sided auctions to those of electricity supplier-only auctions (using the developed bidding strategies).
In this paper the problem of modeling electricity price dynamics in deregulated energy markets is studied. Since the nature of customers' energy consumption, market participants' strategic behavior and the power system reliability indices are stochastic processes, the electricity price model will be stochastic as well. In our analysis the price of electricity is modeled based on the customers' hourly consumption, day-ahead/real-time energy prices, generation and transmission outage schedules (evaluation of the power system reliability indices), spinning reserve requirements, demand elasticity and predicted strategic behavior of market participants.
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