Gaming Analysis in Joint Energy and Spinning Reserve Markets

Haghighat, H.; Seifi, Hossein; Kian, A.R.

doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2007.907389

Cited by 66 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The strategy set of admissible bidding variables for power producer n is given by No player will increase payoff by unilaterally changing its bidding strategy when the game obtains a Nash equilibrium [31,32]. Although the game only exists among the upper partners, the decision of every power producer will be influenced by other power producers, as well as by the power generation dispatch policy from the lower partner of the bi-level optimization.…”

Section: Non-cooperative Game Theoretic Optimization Approach and Algmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Game Theoretical Approach Based Bidding Strategy Optimization for Power Producers in Power Markets with Renewable Electricity

Tang

Ling

et al. 2017

Energies

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Abstract:In a competitive electricity market with substantial involvement of renewable electricity, maximizing profits by optimizing bidding strategies is crucial to different power producers including conventional power plants and renewable ones. This paper proposes a game-theoretic bidding optimization method based on bi-level programming, where power producers are at the upper level and utility companies are at the lower level. The competition among the multiple power producers is formulated as a non-cooperative game in which bidding curves are their strategies, while uniform clearing pricing is considered for utility companies represented by an independent system operator. Consequently, based on the formulated game model, the bidding strategies for power producers are optimized for the day-ahead market and the intraday market with considering the properties of renewable energy; and the clearing pricing for the utility companies, with respect to the power quantity from different power producers, is optimized simultaneously. Furthermore, a distributed algorithm is provided to search the solution of the generalized Nash equilibrium. Finally, simulation results were performed and discussed to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed non-cooperative game-based bi-level optimization approach.

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Section: Non-cooperative Game Theoretic Optimization Approach and Algmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Game Theoretical Approach Based Bidding Strategy Optimization for Power Producers in Power Markets with Renewable Electricity

Tang

Ling

et al. 2017

Energies

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“…When cheaper GenCo i has to have generation at its maximum capacity, the share of more expensive GenCos increases because demand is not elastic; therefore, the market price rises. The way to calculate coe cient i is shown in [17].…”

Section: The Iso Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the early years of electricity market, energy and ancillary services used to be settled in separate markets; however, there is wide consensus today that energy and reserve should be o ered and cleared simultaneously in integrated markets to minimize the overall cost of supplying energy and provision of reserve [14]. In recent years, various papers have dealt with the simultaneous settlement of energy and Spinning Reserve (SR) [15][16][17][18][19]. In [18] a thorough literature review on joint energy and reserve markets modeling is presented.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the outer level, each GenCo tries to maximize its individual welfare by adjusting its supply function parameters; in the inner level, ISO tries to maximize the social welfare [21]. To solve these two problems, authors have utilized various tools of optimization such as BA algorithm [3], Lagrangian relaxation [17], Q-learning [22], and genetic algorithm [23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A New Solution Approach for Supply Function Equilibrium-based Bidding Strategy in Electricity Markets

Hematabadi

Foroud

2017

Scientia Iranica

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Abstract. This paper presents a new analytical solution method for Supply FunctionEquilibrium-based (SFE) bidding strategy in electricity markets. It is assumed that every Generation Company (GenCo) has some generation units and bids a Linear Supply Function (LSF) for each of its units to the Independent System Operator (ISO). The problem is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem; in the inner level, ISO clears the market to maximize social welfare; in the outer level, each GenCo tries to maximize its individual welfare. The proposed method is used to solve the outer-level problem using an iterative algorithm, in which LSF coe cients are parameterized. The formulation is developed for both elastic and non-elastic demands for single-and multi-generator cases and also for integrated energy and Spinning Reserve (SR) markets with three models of competitions: a-, b-, and k-parameterization. Three sample networks are used to evaluate the proposed method. The results show that the proposed method is e ective and accurate for GenCos' strategic bidding in electricity markets compared with other optimization algorithms.

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“…It addresses capacity, energy and reserve dispatch problems that may arise from n-1 contingency scenarios. Haghighat et al (2007) concentrated on the strategic interaction among suppliers in a centralized market, where electrical energy and spinning reserve are simultaneously traded. A bi-level optimization technique and a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints approach are utilized to develop an optimal bidding strategy for competitive suppliers participating in these markets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy market and reserve market modeling in simultaneous and serial implementation methods with the aim of reducing electricity costs

Ghoraba¹,

Ameli²

2012

IJIEC

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In competitive electricity markets, power needed for the network's reserve is purchased from the ancillary service market. In this market, producing units and buyers alike announce their offers. As will be seen, energy market and reserve market implementation is possible with simultaneous method and serial method by choosing each of the methods based on the type of market and other conditions. In this paper, the energy market and the active power reserve market are simulated in two formations as serial and simultaneous for a uniform pricing system. In each method, limitations of transferring power over the lines, based on available transfer capacity (ATC), is considered alongside the other constraints in the energy market and the active power reserve market. Then, during network overload, economic dispatch is accomplished between winner units in the reserve market by using a linear optimization problem, and needed power is provided from these units at a minimal cost. Finally, our proposed methods are implemented on an IEEE 39-bus test system and results are analyzed.

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Gaming Analysis in Joint Energy and Spinning Reserve Markets

Cited by 66 publications

References 27 publications

A Game Theoretical Approach Based Bidding Strategy Optimization for Power Producers in Power Markets with Renewable Electricity

A Game Theoretical Approach Based Bidding Strategy Optimization for Power Producers in Power Markets with Renewable Electricity

A New Solution Approach for Supply Function Equilibrium-based Bidding Strategy in Electricity Markets

Energy market and reserve market modeling in simultaneous and serial implementation methods with the aim of reducing electricity costs

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