Abstract-MATPOWER is an open-source Matlab-based power system simulation package that provides a high-level set of power flow, optimal power flow (OPF), and other tools targeted toward researchers, educators, and students. The OPF architecture is designed to be extensible, making it easy to add user-defined variables, costs, and constraints to the standard OPF problem. This paper presents the details of the network modeling and problem formulations used by MATPOWER, including its extensible OPF architecture. This structure is used internally to implement several extensions to the standard OPF problem, including piece-wise linear cost functions, dispatchable loads, generator capability curves, and branch angle difference limits. Simulation results are presented for a number of test cases comparing the performance of several available OPF solvers and demonstrating MATPOWER's ability to solve large-scale AC and DC OPF problems.
Abstract-Malicious attacks against power systems are investigated, in which an adversary controls a set of meters and is able to alter the measurements from those meters. Two regimes of attacks are considered. The strong attack regime is where the adversary attacks a sufficient number of meters so that the network state becomes unobservable by the control center. For attacks in this regime, the smallest set of attacked meters capable of causing network unobservability is characterized using a graph theoretic approach. By casting the problem as one of minimizing a supermodular graph functional, the problem of identifying the smallest set of vulnerable meters is shown to have polynomial complexity. For the weak attack regime where the adversary controls only a small number of meters, the problem is examined from a decision theoretic perspective for both the control center and the adversary. For the control center, a generalized likelihood ratio detector is proposed that incorporates historical data. For the adversary, the tradeoff between maximizing estimation error at the control center and minimizing detection probability of the launched attack is examined. An optimal attack based on minimum energy leakage is proposed.Index Terms-Power system state estimation, false data attack, bad data detection, power network observability, smart grid security.
Abstract-Stability is an important constraint in power system operation. Often trial and error heuristics are used that can be costly and imprecise. A new methodology that eliminates the need for repeated simulation to determine a transiently secure operating point is presented. The theoretical development is straightfforward: dynamic equations are converted to numerically equivalent algebraic equations and then integrated into the standard OPF formulation. Implementation issues and simulation results are discussed in the context of a 162-bus system.
Abstract-The problem of constructing malicious data attack of smart grid state estimation is considered together with countermeasures that detect the presence of such attacks. For the adversary, using a graph theoretic approach, an efficient algorithm with polynomial-time complexity is obtained for the design of unobservable malicious data attacks. When the unobservable attack does not exist due to restrictions of meter access, attacks are constructed to minimize the residue energy of attack while guaranteeing a certain level of increase of mean square error. For the control center, a computationally efficient algorithm is derived to detect and localize attacks using the generalized likelihood ratio test regularized by an L1 norm penalty on the strength of attack.
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