Bidding Strategies in Oligopolistic Dynamic Electricity Double-Sided Auctions

Kian, A.R.; Cruz, J.B.; Thomas, Robert J.

doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2004.840413

Cited by 70 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Market clearing price is determined by the intersection of two aggregated curves. All buyers winning the auction pay the clearing price for per unit power, and all sellers winning the auction are paid the clearing price for per unit power [36,37]. The pricing mechanism 2 is usually regarded as spot exchange, which can be used for a short-term trading of days, hours, or even minutes before the electricity is dispatched [33].…”

Section: Pricing Mechanism 2: Double-sided Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electricity Market Creation in China: Policy Options from Political Economics Perspective

et al. 2018

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Abstract:In 2015, a new round reform of the marketization for the electricity sales in China is launched. This paper investigates the policy selection for this reform in China, from the perspective of political economics. We analyze the policy selection of the 2015 reform from two aspects of market structure and pricing mechanism. According to the policy of the 2015 reform, China's power industry is of great potential to develop the market structures of "integration of generation and retail services while integrating transmission and distribution" versus "integration of generation, distribution and retail services while independent of transmission". Those two market structures have advantages on competition efficiency and political practicability. For the pricing mechanisms, the power exchange market of China can take bilateral contracts for the long-term trading and double-sided auctions for the short-term trading, as well as for the spot market. In addition, electricity financial market can be set up as a supplement for the power exchange market, which is of potential contribution to manage the risk and discover the effective price. The 2015, reform assigns two state-owned grid companies the responsibility of the demand side management. The intelligent system to improve the information management of energy consumption can be established. Utilization of renewable energy is also emphasized in the 2015 reform for energy sustainability in China. Effective policy instruments, such as the efficient subsidy policy, an independent exchange market, and a quota system, for the promotion of renewable energy utilization, can be implemented.

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Section: Pricing Mechanism 2: Double-sided Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electricity Market Creation in China: Policy Options from Political Economics Perspective

et al. 2018

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“…Of course, these rules have also major influence on the behavior of the agents; different bidding strategies are considered by Kian et al [8] and optimal strategies are known as well [3]. Also classical auction schemes as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions [6] or other game theoretic approaches and approaches from computational learning theory have been applied [12].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hierarchically Structured Energy Markets as Novel Smart Grid Control Approach

Lässig

Satzger

Krämer

2011

KI 2011: Advances in Artificial Intelligence

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. The paper investigates the self-stabilization of hierarchically structured markets. We propose a new approach that is motivated by the physical structure of the energy grid and generalizes classical market structures in a natural way. Hierarchical markets have several advantages compared to monolithic markets, i.e., improved reliability and scalability, locality of information, and proximity of energy production and consumption. By simulating scenarios based on real world consumption and production data including households, different renewable energy sources, and other plant types, we present a proof-of-concept of stability of the hierarchical markets in various simulations.

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“…Kian et al [18] have modeled double sided auctions dynamically. Their model was based on closed loop NashCournot strategies for participants (generating firms and load serving entities).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study of electricity market dynamics using Invasive Weed Colonization Optimization

Sahraei-Ardakani

Roshanaei

Rahimi-Kian

et al. 2008

2008 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games

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Abstract-A method based on the novel optimization algorithm of Invasive Weed colonization Optimization (IWO) is used to study electricity market dynamics. Dynamics of such a multi agent system is analyzed using aspects both from Game theory and IWO. The method is integrated with a power system simulator to consider all the constraints of a realistic power system to make sure that the results are reliable. The IWO has also been introduced briefly and it is discussed why this method is supposed to be appropriate in such problems. Several simulation studies are presented to show how the method works. These outputs are compared with what exist in the literature. It is shown that making use of search based optimization algorithms such as IWO is necessary for consideration of all the constraints and details.

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Bidding Strategies in Oligopolistic Dynamic Electricity Double-Sided Auctions

Cited by 70 publications

References 9 publications

Electricity Market Creation in China: Policy Options from Political Economics Perspective

Electricity Market Creation in China: Policy Options from Political Economics Perspective

Hierarchically Structured Energy Markets as Novel Smart Grid Control Approach

A study of electricity market dynamics using Invasive Weed Colonization Optimization

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