When the party’s over: political blame attribution under an electoral authoritarian regime

Abstract

How is the perception of the state authorities affected when an economic downturn interferes with citizens' patriotic unity? Which reaction takes the upper hand: a 'rally around the flag' born of geopolitical success, or grievance over economic misfortune? By means of a survey experiment, we aim to explore the mechanisms of blame and credit when a rally around the flag coincides with a major economic downturn, and we estimate the effects of the Crimean events and the economic crisis on how Russians assess the performance of federal political institutions. Our findings suggest that economic hardships are attributed exclusively to the government and the State Duma, while it is only the president who benefits from the rally around the flag. Moreover, the president receives additional benefit when the 'patriotic unity' priming meets the 'economic hardship' priming, thereby resulting in a double rally around the flag effect. This suggests that the president stands apart from state institutions when responsibility is assigned, and he is the only one to enjoy national consolidation around him, which is further reinforced by poor economic conditions. Spotlighting the president increases his popularity and consequently increases the costs of political divides, while the legislature and the government can be exploited as scapegoats for policy failures.

How biased media generate support for the ruling authorities: Causal mediation analysis of evidence from Russia

“…Authoritarian news coverage represents a concentrated form of selective reporting with a pro-government framing and interpretation. Overwhelming state-controlled news makes people adopt inaccurate factual beliefs and shift blame if any from the ruling officials to the regime foes, strengthening the incumbents’ position in power (Sirotkina and Zavadskaya, 2019).…”

From Moscow with a Mushroom Cloud? Russian Public Attitudes to the Use of Nuclear Weapons in a Conflict with NATO

“…In fact, the manufacturing of domestic consent in foreign and defense policy has become increasingly important for the ruling elite in Moscow over the years. As Gudkov (2019) argues, there is a link between militarism, foreign policy adventurism, and the suppression of domestic dissent in contemporary Russia (see also Snegovaya 2020;Sirotkina and Zavadskaya 2020). The shaping of public opinion on nuclear weapons, along with other defense issues, has become the key tool in President Putin's toolbox (Wagner 2021;Kolesnikov 2016)which is why, for example, nuclear missiles are regularly paraded on Victory Day in Moscow, and shops sell tshirts with quips like "Sanctions?…”

Leadership Discourses on Bureaucracy: Continuity over a Century

“…In a time of economic diffi culties, imitation of bureaucratic reforms becomes part of the political program for maintaining the stability of the regime (cf. Sirotkina and Zavadskaya 2020).…”

“…At the meso-level, effi ciency, accountability, equity, and social responsibility in service delivery never constituted the basic principles (Goncharov and Shirikov 2013, 25 -26). Bureaucracy-bashing can rally the public around a paramount leader in times of economic hardship, while the administration can be exploited as a "scapegoat" for policy failures (Sirotkina and Zavadskaya 2020).…”