Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back

Abstract

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated a new phenomenon known as soft balancing, in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. There is little credible evidence, however, that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditional diplomatic friction; and, regardless, specific predictions of soft balancing are not supported by the evidence. Balancing against the United States is not occurring because contemporary U.S. grand strategy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat to only a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups. Most countries either share U.S. strategic interests in the war on terrorism or do not have a direct stake in the confict. As such, balancing behavior is likely only among a narrowly circumscribed list of states and actors being targeted by the United States.

Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

“…4 See also Layne (2006), Pape (2005), Paul (2004), and Paul (2005). For a critique of soft balancing see Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), Lieber and Alexander (2005), and Pape (2005). 5 See also Schweller (1994).…”

“…9 Low hegemonic engagement in a region entails minor or no military installations or troop presence, no alliances and perhaps even few trade treaties, limited involvement in regional institutions and governing bodies, and reliance on international institutions rather than direct hegemonic participation in policing and brokering peace agreements. 10 Scholars and policy makers differ on whether (or not) high hegemonic engagement is self-defeating and will provoke counter-balancing against the hegemon (Lieber and Alexander, 2005;Posen, 2006). Scholars who contend that high hegemonic engagement is counter-productive maintain that the rising states, such as Brazil, India, China or South Africa, will counter-balance not by traditional means of hard balancing such as alliances or domestic military buildup but rather by means of soft-balancing that, as noted earlier, entails using international institutions, diplomacy and economic statecraft to resist and restrain the hegemon (Pape, 2005;Paul, 2005).…”

The EU-Thailand Relations : Tracing the Patterns of New Bilateralism

“…28 Some criticisms have been raised against the concepts of 'soft balancing'. Lieber and Alexander (2005), for instance, claim that soft balancing is just normal diplomatic friction, that defining and operationalizing it seems difficult, and that there is a lack of evidence to suggest its emergence or to support the predictions of the concepts. 29 Pape (2005: 36-37), for example, has identified four common measures that states can use to pursue their soft balancing objectives: (i) 'territorial denial', (ii) 'entangling diplomacy', (iii) 'economic strengthening', and (iv) 'signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition'.…”

Liberaler Imperialismus und imperialer Liberalismus als Erklärungsansätze amerikanischer Außenpolitik

“…Das Hauptargument lautet, dass sich die meisten der seit 2002 aufgestellten Prognosen über die strategischen Konsequenzen der Bush-Politik nicht erfüllt hätten. Die vermutete Gegenmachtbildung gegen die USA unter Einbezug von Europäern, Russen und Chinesen sei nicht eingetreten (bestenfalls in bescheidenen Ansätzen) (Lieber/Alexander 2005;Pape 2005;Paul 2005). Die internationale Ordnung befinde sich zwar in einer Krise, sie sei aber nicht kollabiert und der prognostizierte Übergang zu einem System der Selbsthilfe sei nicht eingetreten (Wohlforth 1999;Lieber 2003: 28-31;Krause 2004).…”