Formal political institutions have been assigned two roles in democratization theorizing: as contingent effects of strategic interaction and as predictable bases for democratic consolidation. These roles might be reconciled if we assume that institutions become persistent once in place. But patterns of behavior surrounding these institutions do not appear to conform to the expectations of path dependency or comparable frameworks: while unchallenged in some cases, these institutions are repeatedly contested and often enough revised in others. This is true even of ‘low stakes’ institutional designs. Consequently, groups often perceive institutional designs not as ‘locked in’ and instead as malleable over even a few years. Codified political institutions therefore appear unable to generate the reduced risks - in effect, the credible commitments - which Adam Przeworski’s argument about democratic consolidation requires. This conclusion suggests that consolidation may result from reductions in political risks caused by non-institutional factors. It also has implications for diverse arguments which assume stability or predictability in formal institutions.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated a new phenomenon known as soft balancing, in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. There is little credible evidence, however, that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditional diplomatic friction; and, regardless, specific predictions of soft balancing are not supported by the evidence. Balancing against the United States is not occurring because contemporary U.S. grand strategy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat to only a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups. Most countries either share U.S. strategic interests in the war on terrorism or do not have a direct stake in the confict. As such, balancing behavior is likely only among a narrowly circumscribed list of states and actors being targeted by the United States.

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The third wave of democratization has been accompanied by two innovative theoretical claims that procedural regime attributes have systematic consequences for substantive outcomes under democracy and authoritarianism. Many “rule of law” claims associate democracy with lower risks and greater predictability over outcomes than authoritarianism. The “institutionalized uncertainty” claim expects nearly the opposite pattern. Each has important implications for regime support and thus for regime (in)stability. This article argues that neither approach effectively captures global patterns of risk and predictability. A reconsideration shows that both approaches mischaracterize both regime types. Predictability is shown to vary at least as much across as between the two regime types. This is the result of factors exogenous to procedures, such as structures of political, social, and economic conflict. As a result, these structural conditions, rather than regime features alone, explain outcomes such as democratic instability and consolidation. Evidence suggests this is the case.

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