“…Yet does China’s recent growth, indicating a power shift reducing the huge US advantage, necessarily mean that it is balancing the United States? Some analysts consider one country’s relative power gain to have the effect of necessarily balancing another country (Art 2005/06; Ross 2006). 11 Naturally, balancing policies may not achieve balanced power as an outcome, and a situation of power becoming more balanced may come about as a result of states’ internal conditions and without deliberate policies to balance (for example, Nexon 2009).…”
Section: Asian Scholars’ Divergent Viewsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a distinction is crucial to the ongoing debate about backlash against the United States after it invaded Iraq. Analysts writing about other states’ disposition to “soft balance” against the United States draw attention to not necessarily the preponderance of US power as the motivation for their behavior, but rather to Washington’s policies that have had this blowback effect (for example, Art 2005/06; Pape 2005; Paul 2005). Walt (2005) argued forcefully that other states respond not so much to how much power is possessed by the United States, but rather to how the United States has used or intends to use its power.…”
Section: Contested Explanations Of East Asian Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“… This phenomenon has prompted a debate on “soft balancing.” In contrast to “hard balancing” which entails ramping up one’s armament and joining an opposing coalition, “soft balancing” involves less confrontational mechanisms such as “territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition” (Pape 2005:36). On the relevant debate, see Art (2005/06), Brooks and Wohlforth (2005/06, 2005), Lieber and Alexander (2005/06, 2005), Pape (2005), and Paul (2005). On “soft balancing” applied to China, see Khong (2004). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… Robert Art (2005/06:185) remarked: “The default position of states, especially when it comes to military matters, is not dependence, but autonomy and independence, if they can achieve it.” The decisions by Japan and Germany not to pursue nuclear weapons are therefore enigmatic from a realist perspective (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993, 2000). Ukraine’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons presents an even greater departure from the supposed default position (Brooks 1997).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…“If China is engaged merely in a general increase in its military capabilities, with no specific adversary in mind, and if these changes result in enhanced Chinese military power in East Asia at the expense of the United States, then China is offsetting and thereby balancing U.S. power, even if it did not explicitly design its efforts to do so. Increases in a state’s power relative to other states have consequences for the balance of power among them, irrespective of the state’s intentions” (Art 2005/06:180).…”
Are East Asian states reacting to China’s rise according to balance‐of‐power expectations? This review discusses the pertinent debate and presents overtime data germane to this question. It raises several issues of theoretical argumentation and historical purview pertaining to this debate, and concludes that the conduct of China’s neighbors thus far is anomalous from the traditional balance‐of‐power perspective.
“…Yet does China’s recent growth, indicating a power shift reducing the huge US advantage, necessarily mean that it is balancing the United States? Some analysts consider one country’s relative power gain to have the effect of necessarily balancing another country (Art 2005/06; Ross 2006). 11 Naturally, balancing policies may not achieve balanced power as an outcome, and a situation of power becoming more balanced may come about as a result of states’ internal conditions and without deliberate policies to balance (for example, Nexon 2009).…”
Section: Asian Scholars’ Divergent Viewsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a distinction is crucial to the ongoing debate about backlash against the United States after it invaded Iraq. Analysts writing about other states’ disposition to “soft balance” against the United States draw attention to not necessarily the preponderance of US power as the motivation for their behavior, but rather to Washington’s policies that have had this blowback effect (for example, Art 2005/06; Pape 2005; Paul 2005). Walt (2005) argued forcefully that other states respond not so much to how much power is possessed by the United States, but rather to how the United States has used or intends to use its power.…”
Section: Contested Explanations Of East Asian Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“… This phenomenon has prompted a debate on “soft balancing.” In contrast to “hard balancing” which entails ramping up one’s armament and joining an opposing coalition, “soft balancing” involves less confrontational mechanisms such as “territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition” (Pape 2005:36). On the relevant debate, see Art (2005/06), Brooks and Wohlforth (2005/06, 2005), Lieber and Alexander (2005/06, 2005), Pape (2005), and Paul (2005). On “soft balancing” applied to China, see Khong (2004). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… Robert Art (2005/06:185) remarked: “The default position of states, especially when it comes to military matters, is not dependence, but autonomy and independence, if they can achieve it.” The decisions by Japan and Germany not to pursue nuclear weapons are therefore enigmatic from a realist perspective (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993, 2000). Ukraine’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons presents an even greater departure from the supposed default position (Brooks 1997).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…“If China is engaged merely in a general increase in its military capabilities, with no specific adversary in mind, and if these changes result in enhanced Chinese military power in East Asia at the expense of the United States, then China is offsetting and thereby balancing U.S. power, even if it did not explicitly design its efforts to do so. Increases in a state’s power relative to other states have consequences for the balance of power among them, irrespective of the state’s intentions” (Art 2005/06:180).…”
Are East Asian states reacting to China’s rise according to balance‐of‐power expectations? This review discusses the pertinent debate and presents overtime data germane to this question. It raises several issues of theoretical argumentation and historical purview pertaining to this debate, and concludes that the conduct of China’s neighbors thus far is anomalous from the traditional balance‐of‐power perspective.
Japan's security policy has changed dramatically in recent years. The country balances harder against China, and its armed forces are increasingly autonomous from their American counterparts. What explains Japan's growing autonomy and balancing tendency after decades of relative apathy? I argue that this new strategic orientation results from unprecedented doubts about the effectiveness of its traditional security policy amidst an unstable China-U.S.-Japan triangular relationship. Tokyo is increasingly uncertain about American security commitments in the face of a more assertive China. As both the alliance with the United States and the accommodation of China are becoming unsuitable strategies for guaranteeing national security, Japan reverts to a more autonomous and resolute posture. Japan's new security policy will have important consequences for the triangular relationship.
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