“Japan is back”: Autonomy and balancing amidst an unstable China–U.S.–Japan triangle

Abstract

Japan's security policy has changed dramatically in recent years. The country balances harder against China, and its armed forces are increasingly autonomous from their American counterparts. What explains Japan's growing autonomy and balancing tendency after decades of relative apathy? I argue that this new strategic orientation results from unprecedented doubts about the effectiveness of its traditional security policy amidst an unstable China-U.S.-Japan triangular relationship. Tokyo is increasingly uncertain about American security commitments in the face of a more assertive China. As both the alliance with the United States and the accommodation of China are becoming unsuitable strategies for guaranteeing national security, Japan reverts to a more autonomous and resolute posture. Japan's new security policy will have important consequences for the triangular relationship.

From Balancing to Accommodation: Understanding the Philippines’s Relations with the US and China in Post-Arbitration Period

“…If a country chooses internal balancing as a strategy, it builds the military capabilities by its own efforts. Internal balancing is a self-reliance strategy, which means that the country does not rest upon others for its security (Fatton, 2018). Another balancing strategy is external balancing which is to seek to coalesce with other countries and aims at enhancing the power of allies to face a common threat (Waltz, 1979).…”

“…The main benefits of this strategy are to reduce the domestic losses related to internal balancing since external balancing distributes the burden to other countries for a credible deterrence. Hence, the main risks lie in ally, for in the event of a crisis, conflict, war, ally can withdraw its support from other ally (Snyder, 1997;Fatton, 2018). A country intends to suspect about its ally's security commitments and fear of being abandoned if the other is incapable of fulfilling its engagements, or if the ally and the opponent have a constructive relationship.…”

“…However, this way of addressing this question ends up offering amputated portrays of secondary state polices. For instance, some countries in East Asia are embracing this dual approach, on one hand, they employ institutional binding with the US in order to balance China by security concerns, on another hand, and they seek to accommodate China looking mostly to economic benefits Paik, 2017: Smith, 2009;Fatton, 2018;2004 Ikenberry). Yet, if South Korea, Vietnam, and Japan fall in this category, the case of the Philippines, after international arbitration, presents a notable variation.…”

“…Furthermore, in the case of Philippines, any US movement needs to take into account a more powerful China that has developed a sophisticated anti-access/area-denial strategy made of missiles, submarines, aircraft, and electronic warfare devices and dedicated to preventing the US from projecting power in East and Southeast Asia. Moreover, the US faces budget constraints in the last years (Fatton, 2018).…”

The Autonomy‒Alignment Trade‐Off: Japan’s Evolving Defense Posture

“…The orientation of Japan’s security policy has been differentially interpreted by scholars in recent years. Lionel Fatton () argues that Japan is pursuing greater autonomy from the United States in response to apprehensions about its traditional security policy. Other scholars have argued that Japan is strengthening its alliance with the United States.…”