Varieties of Multiple Antecedent Cause

Engelhardt, Jeff

doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0147-3

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Nomological sufficiency can also be articulated within a counterfactual model of causation. Here is a common method: p is nomologically sufficient for p * if the nearest worlds where p occurs are also worlds where p * occurs (Engelhardt , 237; Menzies , 63; Kroedel , 366). Nomological sufficiency also gains credence from those considerations seeking to weaken absolute sufficiency.…”

Section: Nomological Sufficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Moore

2019

Dialectica

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Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.

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Section: Nomological Sufficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Moore

2019

Dialectica

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“…At the same time, a is logically sufficient for the fact that b , the poet looks at the bird in 13 ways and c is logically necessary for the fact that b (Sanford 1975, 109; cp. Engelhardt 2012, 237). Nor is the proposed relationship that exists between a ’s sufficiency for b and c ’s unnecessity for b a relationship of necessary conditions and sufficient conditions.…”

Section: Motivating the Causal Exclusion Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thomas Kroedel argues that p is nomologically sufficient for p* if the material conditional p → p* is true in a suitable range of possible worlds (Kroedel 2015a, 366). Relatedly, Jeff Engelhardt argues that p is nomologically sufficient for p* if p □→ p* is true in this world and relevant nearby possible worlds (Engelhardt 2012, 237). Either of these last two definitions can serve as a suitable definition of nomological sufficiency.…”

Section: Counterfactualist Compatibilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals

Moore

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the causal exclusion problem.

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“…Each of the following plausibly understands the problem in this way: Simon Blackburn (); Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith (); Tyler Burge (); D. H. Mellor (); Paul Noordhof (); D. Gene Witmer (, pp. 204–5); Karen Bennett (); Sydney Shoemaker (); Amie L. Thomasson (, p. 353); Jeff Engelhardt ().…”

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confidence: 99%

What is the Exclusion Problem?

Engelhardt

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Abstract:The philosophical literature contains at least three formulations of the problem of causal exclusion. Although each of the three most common formulations targets theories according to which some effects have 'too many determiners', no one is reducible to either of the others. This article proposes two 'new' exclusion problems and suggests that exclusion is not a single problem but a family of problems unified by the situations they problematize. It is shown, further, that for three of the most popular attempts to solve one or another of the 'old' problems, each remains vulnerable to one of the 'new' exclusion problems.

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Varieties of Multiple Antecedent Cause

Cited by 5 publications

References 32 publications

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals

What is the Exclusion Problem?

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