Abstract:According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the ca… Show more
IntroductionOne of the core experiences we share as human beings is the impact our intentions and decisions have on our life. We think that the decisions we make, from the major ones like getting married, to small ones, like taking a bottle of water from the fridge on a warm and sunny day, are what causes the actual physical overt actions. However, this shared conviction is problematic for a number of reasons, including questions like: do choices exist at all given the potentially deterministic nature of the universe; are our decisions causal in the action generation or rather the physical brain activations determine all our actions. Most of these questions are parts of a larger framework, the free will problem, which, rather than being a homogenous issue, is an umbrella term for a number of interconnected problems. In recent decades, two most popular angles, discussed in connection to free will, although this division should not be treated as exhaustive, have emerged:(1) is free will possible given the deterministic nature of the universe, and (2) can the conclusions of neuroscientific experiments truly show that our intentions are not causal in the processes of action generation, and therefore we are not free. In this chapter I will argue that these discussions often dismiss one, important component, not only needed for the possibility of free will, but, moreover, implicitly assumed by most of the positions, namely the causal efficacy of the mental.
IntroductionOne of the core experiences we share as human beings is the impact our intentions and decisions have on our life. We think that the decisions we make, from the major ones like getting married, to small ones, like taking a bottle of water from the fridge on a warm and sunny day, are what causes the actual physical overt actions. However, this shared conviction is problematic for a number of reasons, including questions like: do choices exist at all given the potentially deterministic nature of the universe; are our decisions causal in the action generation or rather the physical brain activations determine all our actions. Most of these questions are parts of a larger framework, the free will problem, which, rather than being a homogenous issue, is an umbrella term for a number of interconnected problems. In recent decades, two most popular angles, discussed in connection to free will, although this division should not be treated as exhaustive, have emerged:(1) is free will possible given the deterministic nature of the universe, and (2) can the conclusions of neuroscientific experiments truly show that our intentions are not causal in the processes of action generation, and therefore we are not free. In this chapter I will argue that these discussions often dismiss one, important component, not only needed for the possibility of free will, but, moreover, implicitly assumed by most of the positions, namely the causal efficacy of the mental.
“…To make sure we have the right kind of closure thesis, we thus need to require that every physical effect have a physical cause that suffices on its own (Papineau , 59; cf. Marras , 319; Moore , 23).As these philosophers state, and as discussed in §2, robust physical causal completeness states that the physical world is causally complete in itself, so some complex physical cause p is enough to cause p *, and there is no need to step outside the physical world to include m as a cause of p *, so p can cause p * without m , which is condition (iv).…”
Section: Individual Sufficiencymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Both the Completeness Argument and No‐Departing Argument provide support for condition (iv). Since the sufficient physical cause p is complete , p is all the causation one needs for p *, so if p were to occur without m , p * would still occur, which also shows there is no need to depart the physical world to bring about p * (Marras , 319; Papineau , 59; Moore , 23). The Neuroscientific Argument also supports condition (iv): as the neurosciences advance, it is increasingly likely that some completely neural cause p , without needing some mental cause m as well, will be enough to cause p *.…”
Section: The Causal Exclusion Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…And, if p * only needs the cause p , p * cannot also need some other cause m , so p without m can cause p * (cf. Brand and Swain , 358–359; Brand , 41; Moore , 23).…”
Section: Individual Sufficiencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To make sure we have the right kind of closure thesis, we thus need to require that every physical effect have a physical cause that suffices on its own (Papineau , 59; cf. Marras , 319; Moore , 23).…”
Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.
Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions. Nonreductive physicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will and nonreductive physicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time as nonreductive physicalism is a dominant metaphysical posture, there are few sustained expositions of a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian free willindeed some tell against such an admixture. This paper concocts such a blend by articulating and defending, with some caveats, a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian free will.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
