Some content externalists claim that if C is a theoretical concept and "C" expresses C, then the content of C in a community at a time is determined by how some members of the community at the time-call them "experts"-understand C or use "C". Thus, when non-expert Chauncey utters "C", the content of the concept he expresses does not depend entirely on his intrinsic physical properties, contra the claims of content internalism. This paper proposes that "concept" expresses a theoretical concept, such that the externalist's insights should apply to how we understand claims expressing the view itself and to how we evaluate the arguments alleged to motivate it. With respect to the first, I argue that the content externalist (a) should regard it as unclear at present which proposition her theory expresses, and (b) should take it that content externalism teaches us about our linguistic community rather than about the metaphysical nature of concepts. With respect to the second, I argue that by externalism's own lights, the famous externalist thought experiments shouldn't establish content externalism. In conclusion, I suggest that making sense of content externalism requires presupposing internalism.
Abstract:The philosophical literature contains at least three formulations of the problem of causal exclusion. Although each of the three most common formulations targets theories according to which some effects have 'too many determiners', no one is reducible to either of the others. This article proposes two 'new' exclusion problems and suggests that exclusion is not a single problem but a family of problems unified by the situations they problematize. It is shown, further, that for three of the most popular attempts to solve one or another of the 'old' problems, each remains vulnerable to one of the 'new' exclusion problems.
According to a popular model of mental causation, an irreducible mental cause M1 brings about an irreducible mental effect M2 by bringing about M2's supervenience base (ground, realizer, etc.), P2. Call this 'the Downward Causation View'. This paper raises doubts about the Downward Causation View on grounds that M1 does not cause M2 immediately and there is no causal chain from M1 to M2. Prima facie, then, M1 does not cause M2 on this view. But a theory of mental causation ought to account for how some mental phenomena cause other mental phenomena; so rival theories are to be preferred. After setting out the problem, I consider replies; all fail. 1
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