What is the Exclusion Problem?

Engelhardt, Jeff

doi:10.1111/papq.12063

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(52 reference statements)

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“…Some of these models use the counterfactual model of causation to establish that both m and p are causes of p *, thereby resolving the causal exclusion problem. While I shall focus on the solutions proposed by Barry Loewer (; ) and Thomas Kroedel (; ), others have noted, without necessarily endorsing, this model as a possible strategy (Walter , 681; O’Connor and Churchill , 48; Corry , 37; Engelhardt , 220).…”

Section: Counterfactual Models and Completenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Moore

2019

Dialectica

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Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.

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Section: Counterfactual Models and Completenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Moore

2019

Dialectica

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“…(Kim 1989, 82; cp. Kim 1998, 44–45; Sider 2003; Carey 2011, 254; Engelhardt 2015, 207)According to Kim, if the physical cause p is a sufficient cause, then the physical cause p suffices to, or is all that one needs to, ensure that p * will occur all by itself. So, the distinct event m is not necessary for p * to occur.…”

Section: Motivating the Causal Exclusion Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals

Moore

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the causal exclusion problem.

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An exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism

Saad

2020

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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The chief motivation for epiphenomenalist dualism is its promise to solve dualism's causal exclusion problem without inducing causal overdetermination or violations of the causal closure of the physical. This paper argues that epiphenomenalist dualism is itself susceptible to an exclusion problem. The problem exploits symmetries of determination and influence generated by a wide class of physical theories. Further, I argue that there is an interference effect between solving epiphenomenalist dualism's exclusion problem and using epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the causal exclusion problem. What emerges is an overlooked, empirically motivated challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism.

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What is the Exclusion Problem?

Cited by 6 publications

References 30 publications

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals

An exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism

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