Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

Braun, Sebastian

doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2010.08.004

Cited by 22 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Montagna and Nocco () distinguish between a unionized sector and an outside sector with perfect competition, their framework is thus not suitable to discuss the impact of trade unions on unemployment. In a similar vein, Braun () discusses the implications of sector‐level bargaining vs firm‐level bargaining in a model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous mark‐ups. He finds that the presence of firm‐level unions allows less productive firms to stay in the market, whereas a sector‐level bargain forces the least productive firms to exit relative to the competitive benchmark.…”

Section: General Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He finds that the presence of firm‐level unions allows less productive firms to stay in the market, whereas a sector‐level bargain forces the least productive firms to exit relative to the competitive benchmark. Braun () also assumes an outside‐sector with perfect competition, so that no unemployment arises in his framework. The question of how a unionized labor market affects the labor market outcome has also been tackled by Eckel and Egger ().…”

Section: General Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

Pinto

Michaelis

2014

Rev International Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper analyzes how trade liberalization in ‡uences the unemployment rate of workers with di¤erent abilities. We re…ne the Melitz (2003) framework to account for trade unions and heterogeneous workers, who di¤er with respect to their abilities. Our main …ndings are: (i) highability workers pro…t from trade liberalization in terms of higher wages and higher employment; (ii) the least e¢ cient workers loose their job and switch to long-term unemployment (worker-selection e¤ect); (iii) if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low-skilled workers, trade liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment. In this case, trade liberalization may harm a country's welfare. JEL-Classi…cation: F1, F16, J5 Terms of use: Documents in

show abstract

Section: General Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: General Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

Pinto

Michaelis

2014

Rev International Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As a result, trade liberalisation affects the elasticity of product demand (and hence the degree of product market competition) which in turn influences the wage setting of the union. More recently, Braun () as well as Montagna and Nocco () find the same mechanism, but this is caused by the assumption of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution preferences. Beside this strand of literature, union behaviour is also affected by international integration if the firms’ outside option varies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Redistribution of Trade Gains in the Presence of Firm and Worker Heterogeneity

Pinto

2015

World Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Trade gains are unequally distributed; in particular, low‐ability workers lose out in terms of wages and employment probability. In this paper, we investigate the impact of redistribution schemes on aggregate and disaggregate variables. To this end, we built a trade model with trade unions, heterogeneous firms and workers. Three redistribution schemes are distinguished: unemployment benefits financed by either a wage tax, a payroll tax or a profit tax. We find that: (i) all three redistribution schemes reduce output per capita; (ii) but the marginal reduction is lowest in the wage tax funding scenario; and (iii) If the profit tax is used, labour demand for low‐ability workers increases.

show abstract

“…Braun (2011) incorporates firm-level and sector-level wage setting into the framework of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model; however, he considers only a simplified version of sector-level negotiations by stating a fixed mark-up on competitive wages. Kuhn (1988) constitutes one early example where heterogeneous firms engage in firm-level wage negotiations.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Firm heterogeneity and collective bargaining have also been investigated in alternative model frameworks other than unionized oligopolies. Braun (2011) incorporates firm-level and sector-level wage setting into a monopolistic competition framework with heterogeneous firms as it is frequently used in the international trade literature (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008); however, he considers only a simplified version of sector-level negotiations by stating a fixed mark-up on competitive wages. Kuhn (1988) constitutes one early example where heterogeneous firms engage in firm-level wage negotiations.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

We Want Them All Covered! Collective Bargaining and Firm Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Germany

Baumann

Brändle

2017

Brit J Industrial Rel

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper establishes a link between the extent of collective bargaining and the degree of productivity dispersion within an industry. In a unionised oligopoly model we show that for only small differences in productivity levels. a sector-union can design a collective wage contract that covers a wide range of heterogeneous firms. In sectors with higher productivity dispersion, an industry union has an incentive to demand firm-level wage contracts with the most productive firms, so that they can prevent low-productivity firms from leaving collective coverage. However, such firm-level contracts may not prevent firms at the lower end of the productivity distribution from avoiding collective coverage in sectors with high productivity dispersion. We test the predictions of the model using German linked employer-employee data between 1996 and 2010 and find support for our theoretical results.

show abstract

Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

Cited by 22 publications

References 23 publications

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

Redistribution of Trade Gains in the Presence of Firm and Worker Heterogeneity

We Want Them All Covered! Collective Bargaining and Firm Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Germany

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About