Trial on personhood for chimp "Hiasl"

Balluch, Martin

doi:10.14573/altex.2007.4.335

Cited by 8 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 3 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…According to animal rights activists, the only way to avoid Hiasl's sale or euthanasia would have been to change his status from a thing to a person, whose eventual sale or euthanasia would then be seen as a criminal offence (GAP Germany, ). In the same vein, the recognition of Hiasl as a person would also have given his defendants the right to sue the pharmaceutical lab responsible for Hiasl's initial kidnapping from his African home, his subsequent imprisonment and maltreatment (Hiasl had to live in a windowless basement in tiny cages of about 0.7 m × 1.2m at the beginning and cages of 2.2m × 2.2m at the end of his imprisonment) (Balluch and Theuer, , p. 341). Similarly, if Hiasl had been recognised as a person, he or his defendants could legally have received donations to improve his situation, which is not possible due to Hiasl's status as a thing (GAP Germany, ).…”

Section: An Emerging Change In Perspective: Non‐human Animals As Legamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rediscovery of Indigenous Thought in the Modern Legal System: The Case of the Great Apes

Fraundorfer

2017

Global Policy

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In times of human‐inflicted ecological crises and the mass extinction of countless species, it becomes ever more urgent to redefine how we perceive ourselves and our relationship with the planet's ecosystems and other species. Indigenous cosmologies harbour perspectives fundamentally different from those of modern political and philosophical thought and might serve as guideposts for alternative visions. By looking at the on‐going legal developments in the worldwide struggle for legal personhood for the great apes, this article argues that we are witnessing an unintended (but welcome) introduction of several aspects of indigenous cosmologies to modern political and legal thought. The animal rights movement has achieved a historic breakthrough when in 2016 an Argentine judge recognised the female chimpanzee Cecilia as a legal person. The article briefly summarises how over the last few decades scholars and animal rights movements have gradually questioned the main tenets of the human‐animal divide. Thereafter, the article introduces what Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro calls Amerindian perspectivism: a concept based on a distributive, situational and perspectivist relationship between humans and animals common in Amerindian cultures. Then, the article shows that the on‐going redefinition of great apes as legal persons is reminiscent of key tenets of Amerindian perspectivism.

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Section: An Emerging Change In Perspective: Non‐human Animals As Legamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rediscovery of Indigenous Thought in the Modern Legal System: The Case of the Great Apes

Fraundorfer

2017

Global Policy

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“…Não foi possível obter acesso aos registros ofi ciais do segundo caso no sistema judiciário austríaco e no Tribunal Europeu de Direitos Humanos. Desse modo, a principal fonte da descrição que ofereço é um artigo escrito em coautoria por dois de seus protagonistas: Martin Balluch, ativo militante em favor dos direitos dos animais, cujo envolvimento no caso será esclarecido adiante; e Eberhart Theuer, um dos advogados responsáveis pelo processo (Balluch;Theuer, 2007). Os desdobramentos mais recentes do caso foram discutidos em contatos por correio eletrônico com Eberhart Theuer e Paula Stibbe, a quem agradeço por compartilharem informações sobre as estratégias processuais com uma completa desconhecida.…”

Section: Direitos Humanos E Não Humanosunclassified

“…Na condição de representante legal do chimpanzé, o tutor poderia receber a parcela a ele destinada. Ambos poderiam então decidir juntos em que gastar o dinheiro (Balluch;Theuer, 2007, p. 337).…”

Section: Caso 2: Pode Um Chimpanzé Ser Pessoa? 12unclassified

“…É oportuno assinalar que no início da discussão judicial o chimpanzé era referido tão somente como Hiasl. Essa denominação também é utilizada no artigo publicado pelos demandantes a respeito do caso que, conforme mencionei anteriormente, é a principal fonte da minha própria descrição (Balluch;Theuer, 2007). Numa versão posterior desse texto, entretanto, escrita quando a questão foi levada ao TEDH, o até então "chimp Hiasl" é investido da identidade muito mais respeitável de "chimpanzé Matthew Pan, conhecido afetuosamente como Hiasl".…”

Section: Ciméa Barbato Bevilaquaunclassified

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Chimpanzés em juízo: pessoas, coisas e diferenças

Bevilaqua

2011

Horiz. antropol.

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A partir da análise processos judiciais que colocam em questão a tradicional classificação dos animais como coisas nos sistemas jurídicos ocidentais, o artigo apresenta uma reflexão sobre a fabricação jurídica de pessoas e coisas, bem como sobre o papel que a ciência tem sido chamada a desempenhar nesse contexto. O primeiro processo é um pedido de habeas corpus em favor de duas chimpanzés. O segundo tem como escopo o reconhecimento jurídico de um chimpanzé como pessoa humana. Ao propor que a oposição jurídica fundamental entre pessoa e coisa tem como corolário a homogeneização da diferença, a análise sugere que o problema suscitado pelas demandas de reconhecimento de seres vivos não humanos como sujeitos de direitos está em definir - e, assim, trazer à existência - modos de diferir que se distinguem daqueles que o direito reconhece e normatiza
By focusing on lawsuits in which the long-established categorization of animals as things is at stake, this paper aims to attain a better understanding of the legal fabrication of persons and things, and the role that science lately plays in this context. The first case is an application for habeas corpus on behalf of two female chimpanzees. The scope of the second one is the acknowledgement of a male chimpanzee as a (human) person. It is argued that one corollary of the legal opposition person/thing is the homogenization of difference. Therefore, the problem involved in the recognition of animals as subjects of rights seems to be how to conceptually fabricate - and thereby bring into existence - another difference, i.e., a difference that does not fit in the traditional modes of legal differentiatio

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“…His advocates assert that chimpanzees in general, and Matthew in particular, have demonstrated ample evidence consistent with a theory of mind [25-29]. …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The beginning of the end for chimpanzee experiments?

Knight

2008

Philos Ethics Humanit Med

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The advanced sensory, psychological and social abilities of chimpanzees confer upon them a profound ability to suffer when born into unnatural captive environments, or captured from the wild -as many older research chimpanzees once were -and when subsequently subjected to confinement, social disruption, and involuntary participation in potentially harmful biomedical research. Justifications for such research depend primarily on the important contributions advocates claim it has made toward medical advancements. However, a recent large-scale systematic review indicates that invasive chimpanzee experiments rarely provide benefits in excess of their profound animal welfare, bioethical and financial costs.

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Trial on personhood for chimp "Hiasl"

Cited by 8 publications

References 3 publications

The Rediscovery of Indigenous Thought in the Modern Legal System: The Case of the Great Apes

The Rediscovery of Indigenous Thought in the Modern Legal System: The Case of the Great Apes

Chimpanzés em juízo: pessoas, coisas e diferenças

The beginning of the end for chimpanzee experiments?

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