How does war affect the structure of domestic interests in democratic capitalist states and how are these interests reflected in the conduct of the war? Developing a second image reversed 'plus' argument (outside-in and then inside-out), I contend that war can alter the domestic balance of political power, and can thereby affect the orientation of a state's security strategy. Wars that induce the extraction of wealth and the mobilization of resources will empower a coalition of domestic actors and interest groups who will lobby the government for an offensive security policy, including greater defense spending, military and industrial conscription, state planning and intervention in the economy, and protectionism. I apply this model to Britain and use a research design based on a longitudinal-controlled comparison over the periods of 1912-1914 and 1914-1916 to examine why Britain escalated its involvement in World War I from Limited Liability prior to the outbreak of the war and during the initial years of the war to a Continental Commitment by April of 1916.