The case study, as a method of inquiry, is particularly suited to the field of political psychology. Yet there is little training in political science, and even less in psychology, on how to do case study research. Furthermore, misconceptions about case studies contribute to the methodological barrier that exists within and between the two parent disciplines. This paper reviews the various definitions and uses of case studies and integrates a number of recent insights and advances into a practical guide for conducting case study research. To this end, the paper discusses various stereotypes of the case study and offers specific steps aimed at addressing these criticisms.KEY WORDS: case study, comparative method, research design.The field of political psychology has become increasingly populated with individuals capable of speaking both the language of political science and the language of psychology. This is valuable for building theory and understanding the nature of the empirical domains of interest. Methodologically, however, there remain some persistent obstacles between the two parent disciplines that, in our view, unnecessarily hinder empirical cross-fertilization and advancement. Both social psychologists and political scientists, for example, study the structure and content of mass belief systems, but tend to use different methods (experiments and surveys) and different statistical techniques (analyses of variance and regressions). Margaret Hermann (1989) has indicated that methodological differences between political science and psychology threaten to make the promise of a field of political psychology merely a fantasy. If we are going to continue to develop an interdisciplinary

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Cantir, Cristian and Juliet Kaarbo. (2011) Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743‐8594.2011.00156.x Many of the strengths of research in Foreign Policy Analysis have been overlooked by role theorists. Role theorists often assume that roles are shared across elites and masses, that elites can manipulate masses, or that public opinion on roles constrains elites. Role theorists also tend to assume that there is a consensus among elites over national roles. Research in Foreign Policy Analysis, on the other hand, demonstrates that foreign policy may be contested both vertically (between elites and masses) and horizontally (among elites) and that these conflicts affect foreign policy decision making and foreign policy behavior. We propose that (i) contested roles mean that roles and foreign policy are not as stable as is often implied; (ii) research on contested roles offers Foreign Policy Analysis a less preference‐oriented way of conceptualizing policy disagreements and decision making; and (iii) structures reveal themselves as important when agents use them in domestic discourse over contested roles, but the impact of international norm and role structures is not automatic, as it is shaped by the agents (and domestic structures) in the domestic political process. We suggest that research on the strategic use of roles could bring together these benefits of examining contested roles.

Over the last 25 years, there has been a noteworthy turn across major International Relations (IR) theories to include domestic politics and decision‐making factors. Neoclassical realism and variants of liberalism and constructivism, for example, have incorporated state motives, perceptions, domestic political institutions, public opinion, and political culture. These theoretical developments, however, have largely ignored decades of research in foreign policy analysis (FPA) examining how domestic political and decision‐making factors affect actors’ choices and policies. This continues the historical disconnect between FPA and “mainstream” IR, resulting in contemporary IR theories that are considerably underdeveloped. This article revisits the reasons for this separation and demonstrates the gaps between IR theory and FPA research. I argue that a distinct FPA perspective, one that is psychologically‐oriented and agent‐based, can serve as a complement, a competitor, and an integrating crucible for the cross‐theoretical turn toward domestic politics and decision making in IR theory.

Turkey’s decision on its role in the Iraq war in 2003 illustrates the power—and limits—of parliaments as actors in foreign policy. Traditionally, assemblies are not seen as important players in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies. Instead, cabinets are generally considered the chief policymaking authorities. If the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, legislatures typically support the cabinet, if they are brought into the process at all. The March 1, 2003 vote by the Turkish parliament to not allow the United States to use Turkey as a base for the Iraq invasion challenges this conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence (in addition to many interest‐based explanations of foreign policy). This paper examines this decision in the context of the role of parliaments in foreign policies and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intraparty politics, and public opinion.

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Institutional constraints have been offered by some scholars as an explanation for why multiparty coalitions should be more peaceful than single-party cabinets. Yet others see the same institutional setting as a prescription for more aggressive behavior. Recent research has investigated these conflicting expectations, but with mixed results. We examine the theoretical bases for these alternative expectations about the effects of coalition politics on foreign policy. We find that previous research is limited theoretically by confounding institutional effects with policy positions, and empirically by analyzing only international conflict data. We address these limitations by examining cases of foreign policy behavior using the World Event ⁄ Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset. Consistent with our observation that institutional constraints have been confounded with policy positions, we find that coalitions are neither more aggressive nor more peaceful, but do engage in more extreme foreign policy behaviors. These findings are discussed with regard to various perspectives on the role of institutions in shaping foreign policy behavior.Research on how political institutions affect foreign policy typically focuses on the pacifying consequences of democratic institutions. Political systems that include more voices and interests in the policymaking process purportedly require more time to mobilize domestic players, and input from domestic constituencies presumably constrains leaders who might otherwise take their country to war. This idea is at the heart of the institutional, or structural explanation of the democratic peace, but it has been used by others comparing different types of democratic institutions as well. Some have argued, for example, that democratic political systems with powerful legislatures, compared to systems with weak legislative bodies, will more likely render an executive reluctant to use force (Auerswald 1999;Reiter and Tillman 2002).The notion that institutional constraints translate into more peaceful international behavior has also been used in propositions regarding the effects of coalition politics on the foreign policy of multiparty cabinets. Yet an alternative

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