The case study, as a method of inquiry, is particularly suited to the field of political psychology. Yet there is little training in political science, and even less in psychology, on how to do case study research. Furthermore, misconceptions about case studies contribute to the methodological barrier that exists within and between the two parent disciplines. This paper reviews the various definitions and uses of case studies and integrates a number of recent insights and advances into a practical guide for conducting case study research. To this end, the paper discusses various stereotypes of the case study and offers specific steps aimed at addressing these criticisms.KEY WORDS: case study, comparative method, research design.The field of political psychology has become increasingly populated with individuals capable of speaking both the language of political science and the language of psychology. This is valuable for building theory and understanding the nature of the empirical domains of interest. Methodologically, however, there remain some persistent obstacles between the two parent disciplines that, in our view, unnecessarily hinder empirical cross-fertilization and advancement. Both social psychologists and political scientists, for example, study the structure and content of mass belief systems, but tend to use different methods (experiments and surveys) and different statistical techniques (analyses of variance and regressions). Margaret Hermann (1989) has indicated that methodological differences between political science and psychology threaten to make the promise of a field of political psychology merely a fantasy. If we are going to continue to develop an interdisciplinary

Data from the National Election Studies were examined in an effort to isolate cognitive dissonance of two kinds: dissonance arising from a behavioral commitment in the form of voting, and dissonance arising from inconsistencies associated with having supported the losing candidate. Feeling thermometer ratings of the two principal presidential candidates obtained before and immediately after six elections (1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996) were analyzed. Regression estimates supported a dissonance reduction explanation of observed attitude changes. Voters, as compared to nonvoters, tended to increase the evaluative distance between candidates after an election, whereas supporters of the losing candidate were more likely than supporters of the winning candidate to decrease such evaluative distances. An additional examination of voters yielded results consistent with dissonance theory: After the election, respondents reporting favorable evaluations of both candidates (a difficult choice) tended to spread comparative candidate evaluations compared to respondents who were favorable toward only one candidate (an easy choice). The results both support and cast doubt on prior studies.

Institutional constraints have been offered by some scholars as an explanation for why multiparty coalitions should be more peaceful than single-party cabinets. Yet others see the same institutional setting as a prescription for more aggressive behavior. Recent research has investigated these conflicting expectations, but with mixed results. We examine the theoretical bases for these alternative expectations about the effects of coalition politics on foreign policy. We find that previous research is limited theoretically by confounding institutional effects with policy positions, and empirically by analyzing only international conflict data. We address these limitations by examining cases of foreign policy behavior using the World Event ⁄ Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset. Consistent with our observation that institutional constraints have been confounded with policy positions, we find that coalitions are neither more aggressive nor more peaceful, but do engage in more extreme foreign policy behaviors. These findings are discussed with regard to various perspectives on the role of institutions in shaping foreign policy behavior.Research on how political institutions affect foreign policy typically focuses on the pacifying consequences of democratic institutions. Political systems that include more voices and interests in the policymaking process purportedly require more time to mobilize domestic players, and input from domestic constituencies presumably constrains leaders who might otherwise take their country to war. This idea is at the heart of the institutional, or structural explanation of the democratic peace, but it has been used by others comparing different types of democratic institutions as well. Some have argued, for example, that democratic political systems with powerful legislatures, compared to systems with weak legislative bodies, will more likely render an executive reluctant to use force (Auerswald 1999;Reiter and Tillman 2002).The notion that institutional constraints translate into more peaceful international behavior has also been used in propositions regarding the effects of coalition politics on the foreign policy of multiparty cabinets. Yet an alternative

Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics are responsible for extremity. We test this argument using a global events dataset incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy.

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This article examines international reactions to Scotland’s 2014 bid for independence as an instance of socialisation of an aspirant state, what we term ‘pre-socialisation’. Building on and contributing to research on state socialisation and role theory, this study proposes a nexus between roles and sovereignty. This nexus has three components: sovereignty itself is a role casted for by an actor; the sovereign role is entangled with the substantive foreign policy roles the actor might play; and the sovereign role implicates the substantive foreign policy roles of other actors. The Scottish debate on independence provides an effective laboratory to develop and explore these theoretical dimensions of pre-socialisation, revealing the contested value and meaning of sovereignty, the possible roles that an independent Scotland could play, and the projected implications for the role of the UK and other international actors. Our analysis of the Scottish case can provide insights for other cases of pre-socialisation and is more empirically significant following the UK’s 2016 referendum to leave the European Union.

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