2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00390.x
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When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey’s Iraq Decision

Abstract: Turkey’s decision on its role in the Iraq war in 2003 illustrates the power—and limits—of parliaments as actors in foreign policy. Traditionally, assemblies are not seen as important players in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies. Instead, cabinets are generally considered the chief policymaking authorities. If the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, legislatures typically support the cabinet, if they are brought into the process at all. The March 1, 2003 vote by the Turkish parliament to… Show more

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Cited by 70 publications
(65 citation statements)
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References 32 publications
(53 reference statements)
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“…In a recent study of the effects of parliaments on foreign policy, Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) note that there are very few systematic studies on the role of parliaments in foreign policy. They attribute the lack of attention to the idea in previous research that parliaments do not influence the external behaviour of states.…”
Section: Political Party Oppositionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…In a recent study of the effects of parliaments on foreign policy, Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) note that there are very few systematic studies on the role of parliaments in foreign policy. They attribute the lack of attention to the idea in previous research that parliaments do not influence the external behaviour of states.…”
Section: Political Party Oppositionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Likewise, considerable variation exists at the constitutional level regarding the scope of military operations in which democracies are legally permitted to engage. In recent years, a growing literature has focused on parliamentary veto power and constitutional constraints in the context of democratic accountability and as institutional explanations for democratic participation and nonparticipation in various kinds of military operations (Ku and Jacobson 2003; Born and Ha¨nggi 2005;Dieterich et al 2009;Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010;Kolanoski 2010;Wagner 2011).…”
Section: Institutional Constraintsmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Studies suggest, however, that significant variation exists that eludes the common parliamentary-presidential distinction. It is rather the degree of legislative involvement in military deployment decisions that can, under certain preconditions, reduce war participation (Dieterich et al 2009;Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010).…”
Section: Institutional Constraintsmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…34 we conduct robustness tests in connection with this potential risk of omitted variable bias in the results section. 42 kesgin andkaarbo 2010;Vassilev 2006. the first dependent variable (Sent troops to Iraq in 2003) is coded 1 if a country sent troops to Iraq by the end of 2003 and 0 otherwise.…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%