Thearticlesetsouttofurtheranunderstandingofhowdomesticpoliticscanimpactonforeign policychangeinsmallstates.Thecaseofinterestisthechangethatoccurredintheforeignpolicy ofDenmarkwhenitsgovernmentmanagedtoputanendtothe'footnotepolicy'inmid-1988. The main conclusion is that changes in two particular domestic political factors, in terms of politicalpartyoppositionandpublicopposition,facilitatedachangeinforeignpolicyfortheDanish government.Changesinpartyandpublicoppositioncreatedopportunitiesforthegovernment touseforeignpolicychangeasastrategytoincreaseitspoliticalpoweronthedomesticscene. Inthiscaseofforeignpolicychange,domesticpoliticalfactorsandexternalforceswereequally important.
This article investigates the Swedish decision to participate in Operation Unified Protector in Libya and the Finnish decision to refrain from the same operation. It takes as its theoretical point of departure the concept of strategic culture and argues that differences in the strategic culture of the two countries contributed to the differences in behavior toward the Libya intervention. The Finnish and Swedish strategic cultures differ with respect to the core tasks of the armed forces, willingness to use force, and with respect to what types of operations and organizational frameworks Finland and Sweden find it appropriate to participate in.
In contrast to most previous research on foreign-policy change, this article investigates how an individual decision-maker can have an impact on major changes in foreign policy. The article takes as its theoretical point of departure the concept of leader-driven change, which focuses on the determined efforts of a political leader to change policy. Empirically, the article investigates the change that occurred in Denmark's foreign policy when its government decided to participate in the United Nations sanctions against Iraq in August 1990. The article finds that the foreign minister was the main initiator of the policy change, that his personal characteristics played a decisive role, and that the Gulf crisis created a window of opportunity for the foreign minister to initiate the change in policy. In implementing the policy change, however, the foreign minister could not act independently, since he needed the support of other political actors. On the basis of these empirical findings, the article suggests a new theory of foreign-policy change.
This article emphasizes how individual decision-makers and their perceptions of windows of opportunity can play a decisive role for major changes in the foreign policy of states by conducting two case studies. The first case is the change that occurred in Denmark’s foreign policy in August 1990 when its government dispatched a warship to the Persian Gulf to participate in the monitoring of the United Nations sanctions against Iraq. The second case is the change that occurred in Australia’s foreign policy in April–May 2003 when its government abandoned Australia’s long-standing “hands-off” approach toward Solomon Islands by leading a multinational military intervention. The article demonstrates that individual decision-makers, with a long-standing desire to change policy, perceived structural changes as a window of opportunity for initiating the desired policy changes. The article concludes that, had it not been for these particular individuals, and their perceptions of the world around them, events would most likely have unfolded in a different way.
This article investigates how strategic culture influenced the decision-making of Australia and Poland regarding the global coalition against the Islamic State. In the coalition, Australia has followed its tradition of active participation in United States-led operations, while Poland has embarked on a more cautious line, thereby breaking with its previous policy of active participation. The article examines how Australian and Polish responses to the coalition were shaped by five cultural elements: dominant threat perception, core task of the armed forces, strategic partners, experiences of participating in coalitions of the willing, and approach to the international legality of expeditionary operations. It finds that Australia and Poland differed on all five elements but that the major differences are found in dominant threat perception and core task of the armed forces.
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