Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model

Lobell, Steven E.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511811869.002

Cited by 69 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…As Goldgeier argues, for example, Walt's research “argues for the importance of perceptions, beliefs, motivation, and bias while leaving the origins of these factors to case‐by‐case empirical study rather than systematic theoretical investigation” (Goldgeier :141). Similarly, Lobell's () focus on “threat assessment” does not unpack the psychological underpinnings of threat perception. According to Wivel, NCR needs more attention to how objective material factors, such as power, are perceived and interpreted by decision makers.…”

Section: The Domestic Politics and Decision‐making Turn In Ir Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory

Kaarbo

2015

Int Stud Rev

164

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Over the last 25 years, there has been a noteworthy turn across major International Relations (IR) theories to include domestic politics and decision‐making factors. Neoclassical realism and variants of liberalism and constructivism, for example, have incorporated state motives, perceptions, domestic political institutions, public opinion, and political culture. These theoretical developments, however, have largely ignored decades of research in foreign policy analysis (FPA) examining how domestic political and decision‐making factors affect actors’ choices and policies. This continues the historical disconnect between FPA and “mainstream” IR, resulting in contemporary IR theories that are considerably underdeveloped. This article revisits the reasons for this separation and demonstrates the gaps between IR theory and FPA research. I argue that a distinct FPA perspective, one that is psychologically‐oriented and agent‐based, can serve as a complement, a competitor, and an integrating crucible for the cross‐theoretical turn toward domestic politics and decision making in IR theory.

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Section: The Domestic Politics and Decision‐making Turn In Ir Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory

Kaarbo

2015

Int Stud Rev

164

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“…Moreover, these strategies can change over time given shifts in the level of hegemonic engagement and changes in the relative power of the global hegemon and/or rising states. In addition secondary and tertiary states are often engaged in multiple games in that a security strategy might appear to be costly and suboptimal at one level (that is, against the global hegemon, regional hegemon or domestic opponents) but reasonable and optimal at another level (for an explanation of complex threat identification see Lobell (2009)). Finally, in selecting a specific security strategy secondary and tertiary states will factor the global/systemic, regional/sub-systemic and domestic costs of the alternative strategies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

Lobell¹,

Jesse

Williams

2015

Int Polit

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In this article we examine when and why secondary and tertiary states select a strategy that does not entail following the lead of the rising states. To address these questions we outline a simple model that examines systemic and sub-systemic (regional) constraints on and opportunities for secondary and tertiary states: how engaged in the region is the global hegemon, how many rising (and extra-regional) states are in the region, and which states are waxing and waning and by how much. These three characteristics create different opportunities for and constraints on secondary and tertiary states, which in turn influence the set of strategy choices of these states as they respond to the regional hegemon. Our model cannot account for the specific foreign policy strategies that secondary and tertiary states select. Such a model would require domestic and individual level variables. We leave it to the area specialists and experts in the following articles in the volume to introduce these variables and explain the specific strategies used. Instead, based on our model we can explain general tendencies toward accommodative strategies, resistance strategies and neutral strategies. It is important to note that secondary and tertiary states can use a mix of different strategies toward regional and global hegemons, such as resisting primary threats and accommodating secondary threats. Moreover, secondary and tertiary states are often engaged in multiple games -a strategy might appear to be costly and suboptimal at one level but reasonable and optimal at another level. Finally, in selecting a strategy secondary and tertiary states factor the systemic, subsystemic and domestic costs of the alternative strategies.

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“…Segundo esta perspectiva, a política externa de um país é formulada por uma elite governamental situada entre as arenas doméstica e internacional -o executivo de política externa -que tem o objetivo de identificar e avaliar as mudanças no equilíbrio de poder global ou regional. Evidentemente, essa elite é influenciada por grupos domésticos, que muitas vezes estão mais preocupados com a disputa de poder interna, o que pode afetar a capacidade de se realizar uma política de balanceamento adequado (LOBELL, 2009).…”

Section: Diplomacia Navios De Guerra E Rivalidadeunclassified

“…Na visão de Mearsheimer (2013), potências hegemônicas regionais se esforçam em manter o controle em seus subsistemas ao impedir que outros Estados fortes extra-regionais consigam minar seu domínio. Já para Lobell (2009), as potências regionais lidam com mais desafios do que as potências globais: tratam com ameaças em nível sistêmico, subsistêmi-co ou regional e também na arena doméstica. Assim, a política externa pode responder a diferentes ameaças em diferentes níveis e os líderes de política externa podem agir internacionalmente de modo a influenciar disputas de poder em nível doméstico ou regional.…”

Section: Diplomacia Navios De Guerra E Rivalidadeunclassified

Brasil, Estados Unidos e Argentina no “caso dos contratorpedeiros”, 1937

Waldmann

2017

Estudos Internacionais

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The relationship between Brazil and Argentina was historically known for its rivalry, which occasionally manifested in diplomat-military crisis. One crisis occurred in August 1937, when Brazil and United States negotiated the cession of destroyers to the Brazilian Navy. Since mid-1930s, Vargas government struggled to accomplish a naval renovation plan, to restructure the obsolete Brazilian fleet. The international scenario offered great opportunities to the Brazilian, as the polarization intensified the dispute to supply armaments and for the position of Brazil on the system of alliances. Washington, under the Good Neighbor Policy and alarmed with the growing Axis presence in Latin America, decided to negotiate with the Brazilians despite the isolationist • Belo Horizonte, ISSN 2317-773X, v.4 n.3, p.75 -97 76Congress resistance, offering six destroyers to Brazil. However, a strong criticism arouses against the agreement both in the American public opinion as well in the international community, especially from Argentina. Alarmed by the negative internal and external reactions, Washington gave up, for Brazilian dismay. Proceeding from the classical notions of naval diplomacy and balance of power theory, my goal is to understand the reasons and motivations, in view of domestic and foreign policy, of the main countries involved as well the international effects of the agreement.

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Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model

Cited by 69 publications

References 45 publications

A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory

A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory

Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

Brasil, Estados Unidos e Argentina no “caso dos contratorpedeiros”, 1937

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