The Single-Party Dictator’s Dilemma Information in Elections Without Opposition

Malesky, Edmund J.; Schüler, Paul

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1669700

Cited by 31 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…14.8% missed all three questions (UNDP- PAPI 2011). Rather than providing vertical accountability (O'Donnell 1994), low-quality elections and limited voter information allow DPCs to be captured by local elites who can nominate favored candidates for positions, manipulate candidate vetting in their favor, and use their informational advantage to make sure their choices are elected (Malesky and Schuler 2011). Because these same local elites are also represented on the DPCOM, the DPC has a very hard time fulfilling its oversight role of the local executive (Van Arkadie et al 2010, 155;Vu 2012, 19).…”

Section: Limits On Dpc Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam

2014

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Section: Limits On Dpc Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam

2014

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“…Same as transparency, governance in Vietnam often is subjected to a lack of accountability. However, positive signals were observed by qualitative evidence, such as a study by Malesky et al (2011), which found out that Vietnamese members of Parliament have shown a growing concern of accountability by not casting their votes or even displaying disapproval towards certain disqualified cabinet candidates.…”

Section: Journal Of Public Administration and Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Citizen Participation in Vietnam’s Local Government: Impact on Transparency and Accountability

Hoa¹,

García-Zamor²

2017

JPAG

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Around the world, a growing crisis of legitimacy and complex problem solving characterize a sense of change in the state-citizen relationship. In Vietnam, the Doi Moi (renovation) process was carried out by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the Government of Vietnam (GoV). Public institutions engaged at grassroots level by implementing a decree on "Regulation on Democracy Exercise" with the vision of a participatory society to improve the living standard of the Vietnamese people in general in order to enhance public service specifically. This article conceptualizes the concepts of Citizen Participation, Transparency, and Accountability in Vietnam. In the contested debates of the link between citizen participation and the two governance aspects, transparency and accountability, the article realizes the importance of achieving the balance from both sides of practice, as well as strengthen institutions that can reduce inefficiency and have real effectiveness. The fact that Vietnam just embarked on experimenting with policy initiatives encourages stronger citizen participation. Importantly, citizens participate in a number of elections for their delegates to local and national legislatures. One specific characteristic of public participation in Vietnam is that citizens somewhat are limited in participation by the nomination procedures and restriction in institutions. The article as a brief literature review on citizen participation and establishes the linkages between these three concepts. It reviews policy mechanisms for citizen participation and central-local power relationship. It stresses two main findings after ISSN 2161-7104 2017 http://jpag.macrothink.org 39 performing sufficient empirical evidences. First, it argues that citizen participation can be an engine of good governance in local public institutions in Vietnam. Once policy window provides the population some space for their participation, it assures a widening scale of an efficient governing system. It founds that transparency and accountability of local governments are two outcomes of citizen participation. Journal of Public Administration and Governance

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“…Zaslavsky and Brym 1978;karklins 1986;Magaloni 2006;gandhi and Przeworski 2007;Wright 2008;cox 2009;Blaydes 2011;Fearon 2011;Malesky and schuler 2011;cheibub and Hays 2015;little 2012;Wig and rød 2016;Miller 2015a. 26 Przeworski find that autocracies that "institutionalize sufficiently" (that is, have the predicted number of parties given opposition strength) are more durable.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocratic Elections

Knutsen¹,

Nygård²,

Wig³

2016

World Pol.

102

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Do elections reduce or increase the risk of autocratic regime breakdown? This article addresses this contested question by distinguishing between election events and the institution of elections. The authors propose that elections stabilize autocracies in the long term but at the price of short-term instability. Elections are conducive to regime survival in the long run because they improve capacities for co-optation and repression but produce short-term instability because they serve as focal points for regime opposition. Drawing on data from 259 autocracies from 1946 to 2008, the authors show that elections increase the short-term probability of regime failure. The estimated effect is retained when accounting for the endogeneity of autocratic elections; this finding is critical, since some autocrats may or may not hold elections because of perceived effects on regime survival. The authors also find that this destabilizing effect does not operate in the long term. They find some, although not as strong, evidence that elections stabilize autocratic regimes in the medium to long term, despite their destabilizing immediate effects. These temporal effect patterns are present for both executive and legislative elections, and they are robust to using different measures, control variable strategies, and estimation techniques. In line with expectations, both effect patterns are much clearer for multiparty autocratic elections than for completely uncontested elections.

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The Single-Party Dictator’s Dilemma Information in Elections Without Opposition

Cited by 31 publications

References 35 publications

The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam

The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam

Citizen Participation in Vietnam’s Local Government: Impact on Transparency and Accountability

Autocratic Elections

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