The Political Views of Russian Field Grade Officers

Ball, Deborah Yarsike; Gerber, Theodore P.

doi:10.1080/1060586x.1996.10641420

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 14 publications

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“…Instead, it became possible to interview influential Russians with the potential to impact important policy decisions. A few early efforts along these lines include projects funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Germany) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (US), among others (Hahn 1993;SINUS Moskva 1994, 1995Ball and Gerber 1996;SINUS Moskva and VTsIOM 1996). It was an awareness of these new possibilities that prompted the first round of the Survey of Russian Elites in 1993.…”

Section: Elite Surveys In Russiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: new directions in survey research on Russian elites

Rivera

Zimmerman

2019

Post-Soviet Affairs

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Although a vibrant literature on mass public opinion in Russia emerged in the wake of communism's collapse in the USSR, the systematic investigation of elite attitudes using survey research has lagged conspicuously behind. This gap is particularly noticeable in the realm of foreign policy. Scholars have made strides in analyzing how the country's key decision-maker, Vladimir Putin, views the world (e.g., Taylor 2018), yet there is a paucity of research on what shapes the foreign policy attitudes of officials who occupy positions a rung or two down from Putinmuch less of those who possess elite status in the economic, military, media, and education spheres. We know precious little about how these individuals arrive at their opinions of the outside world, what ideological and informational factors constrain and shape their foreign policy views, and whether and why their attitudes diverge from those of the mass public.Designed to fill this gap in our knowledge, this special double issue of Post-Soviet Affairs examines the attitudes of Russian elites toward a wide range of foreign policy matters based on a unique survey research project spanning more than two decades. The contributions to this issue were originally presented at a conference held at Hamilton College (Clinton, New York) in April 2018 with generous funding from the National Science Foundation and the college's Office of the Dean of Faculty. The articles are based on the Survey of Russian Elites (SRE)a data set consisting of seven surveys of high-ranking Russian individuals that were fielded in . While not a panel study, the collection is the only repeated cross-sectional survey of contemporary Russian foreign policy elites and therefore provides a unique window into how the attitudes of the elite stratum as a whole in Russia have changed over time. The following articles demonstrate the rich theoretical potential of this 25-year project by testing propositions drawn from a wide range of literatures, such as those on political psychology, Russian national identity, public opinion, and political communication. These articles are organized around four themes:

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Section: Elite Surveys In Russiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: new directions in survey research on Russian elites

Rivera

Zimmerman

2019

Post-Soviet Affairs

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Russia's Passive Army

Taylor

2001

Comparative Political Studies

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Military coups are considered most likely when state political capacity is low and the army's corporate interests are threatened. However, these conditions are also frequently present in situations in which the military remains politically passive, weakening the explanatory power of these propositions. In Russia, an extremely weak state coexists with an army whose corporate interests have been threatened over the past decade, yet the military has not intervened in high politics. Two alternative explanations for this behavior are examined, one based on internal cleavages in the army (organizational structure) and the second on officer corps norms (organizational culture). Although both accounts are plausible, organizational culture provides the best explanation for Russian military passivity. The importance of this variable is demonstrated in a study of Russian military behavior from 1992 to 1999. Studying nonevents, and moving beyond the coup/noncoup dichotomy, provides a more complete picture of military behavior in domestic politics.

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What Went Wrong in Russia? Controlling The Military-A Partial Success

Barany¹

1999

jod

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The Political Views of Russian Field Grade Officers

Cited by 4 publications

References 14 publications

Introduction: new directions in survey research on Russian elites

Introduction: new directions in survey research on Russian elites

Russia's Passive Army

What Went Wrong in Russia? Controlling The Military-A Partial Success

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