Russia's Passive Army

Abstract

Military coups are considered most likely when state political capacity is low and the army's corporate interests are threatened. However, these conditions are also frequently present in situations in which the military remains politically passive, weakening the explanatory power of these propositions. In Russia, an extremely weak state coexists with an army whose corporate interests have been threatened over the past decade, yet the military has not intervened in high politics. Two alternative explanations for this behavior are examined, one based on internal cleavages in the army (organizational structure) and the second on officer corps norms (organizational culture). Although both accounts are plausible, organizational culture provides the best explanation for Russian military passivity. The importance of this variable is demonstrated in a study of Russian military behavior from 1992 to 1999. Studying nonevents, and moving beyond the coup/noncoup dichotomy, provides a more complete picture of military behavior in domestic politics.

Russian Autocracy Redux: Path Dependency and the Late Modern State

“…The weakness of the Russian state prevents it from fulfilling its most basic functions, including collecting taxes, paying its own employees, and enforcing laws and the constitution. 89 A state so weakened that it cannot fulfill its most basic functions is of course doomed to extinction, hence something had to change: given the basic ideas of path-dependency theory, it is not surprising that the response to such governmental dysfunction was a return to deeply rooted patterns-back to a strong state, in other words, and not simply a rebalancing of state-society relations so as to provide for minimal state functionality. As noted above, newly elected president Vladimir Putin was sufficiently determined to address these weak-state problems so as to make reassertion of vertical authority the centerpiece of his domestic political program.…”