What Went Wrong in Russia? Controlling The Military-A Partial Success

Barany, Zoltán

doi:10.1353/jod.1999.0024

Cited by 17 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Conditions in the army had quickly become appalling, to the extent that soldiers had to be sent berry picking and mushrooming because the army could not feed them, hundreds of thousands of officers and their families—many just having returned from abroad—had no proper place to live, and money could not be found for the maintenance of weapons or for the fuel to operate them. Even though the armed forces endured abuses typically seen as textbook motivations for revolt—drastically reduced budgets, occasionally humiliating treatment by political leaders and the media, and deployments unpopular within the military itself—a coup was widely regarded as unlikely, primarily owing to the Russian officer corps' institutional culture that for long has viewed military rule as wholly illegitimate (Barany 1999; Taylor 2003).…”

Section: Yeltsin and The Armed Forcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Superpresidentialism and the Military: The Russian Variant

Barany¹

2008

Pres Stud Q

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This article explains the evolution of the presidential‐military nexus in post‐Soviet Russia. Why has the role of presidents become the overriding factor in Russian civil‐military relations? What explains the differences between the relationships Russia's two post‐Soviet presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, developed with the armed forces? I argue that following the 1993 crisis between the president and the legislature, and even more so after the 1996 presidential elections, the Russian polity has gradually become a superpresidential authoritarian system and the type of executive‐military relations that has evolved is consistent with this designation. Rather than establishing civilian oversight of the armed forces shared between the legislative and the executive branches, Yeltsin and Putin created a state in which civilian control has become synonymous with presidential control.

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Section: Yeltsin and The Armed Forcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Superpresidentialism and the Military: The Russian Variant

Barany¹

2008

Pres Stud Q

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“…Political, generational, socioeconomic, and regional cleavages are said to prevent concerted action, despite a common interest among officers in rectifying their material plight (Barany, 1999;Mendeloff, 1994). Political, generational, socioeconomic, and regional cleavages are said to prevent concerted action, despite a common interest among officers in rectifying their material plight (Barany, 1999;Mendeloff, 1994).…”

Section: Organizational Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Internal divisions within the army is one of the most commonly advanced explanations for Russian military passivity. Political, generational, socioeconomic, and regional cleavages are said to prevent concerted action, despite a common interest among officers in rectifying their material plight (Barany, 1999;Mendeloff, 1994).…”

Section: Organizational Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Russia's Passive Army

Taylor

2001

Comparative Political Studies

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Military coups are considered most likely when state political capacity is low and the army's corporate interests are threatened. However, these conditions are also frequently present in situations in which the military remains politically passive, weakening the explanatory power of these propositions. In Russia, an extremely weak state coexists with an army whose corporate interests have been threatened over the past decade, yet the military has not intervened in high politics. Two alternative explanations for this behavior are examined, one based on internal cleavages in the army (organizational structure) and the second on officer corps norms (organizational culture). Although both accounts are plausible, organizational culture provides the best explanation for Russian military passivity. The importance of this variable is demonstrated in a study of Russian military behavior from 1992 to 1999. Studying nonevents, and moving beyond the coup/noncoup dichotomy, provides a more complete picture of military behavior in domestic politics.

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“…with accepting bribes, conducting illegal sales of arms and other crimes, 10 but apparently there was no trial. The armed hostilities in the Balkans and the international sanctions also caused a huge rise in the illicit traffic of arms, narcotics, falsified documents and forged currencies, and in the smuggling of persons, precious metals and stones, oil, and essentials such as food, detergents and spare parts.…”

Section: Corruption Among Security Personnelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Council of Europe's group of members and nonmember states called GRECO could serve this purpose, hoping that it will reach the effectiveness of COCOM; 18 (10) providing international technical and material assistance to the efforts in the region to strengthen the integrity of the security personnel by organizing workshops and training courses, and by offering knowhow and advice.…”

Section: Conclusion and Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption Among Security Personnel in Central and Eastern Europe

Bebler¹

2001

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

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What Went Wrong in Russia? Controlling The Military-A Partial Success

Cited by 17 publications

References 7 publications

Superpresidentialism and the Military: The Russian Variant

Superpresidentialism and the Military: The Russian Variant

Russia's Passive Army

Corruption Among Security Personnel in Central and Eastern Europe

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