The Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice, the League of Nations, and the United Nations: A Comparative Empirical Survey

Coplin, William D.; Rochester, J. Martin

doi:10.2307/1957797

Cited by 15 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In our view, there is a need for more theoretical and empirical work that identifies the types of situations in which states are most likely to turn to international judicial bodies to resolve their disputes (see Coplin and Rochester 1972). It is particularly important to understand why state leaders would sometimes view the resort to legal dispute settlement as preferable to reaching a settlement agreement through bilateral negotiations.…”

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confidence: 99%

Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover

2006

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W e develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the "political cover" of an international legal ruling. In such cases, it will be easier for leaders to justify the making of concessions if they are mandated as part of a ruling by an international court or arbitration body. We test a series of domestic-level hypotheses using a dataset comprised of nearly 1,500 rounds of talks concerning disputed territorial claims. Our multivariate analyses indicate that state leaders opt for legal dispute resolution when they are highly accountable to domestic political opposition, as well as when the dispute is highly salient to domestic audiences.

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Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover

2006

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“…A territorial loss may make leaders susceptible to stronger opposition and removal from power through elections (Gelpi & Grieco, 2001; Goemans, 2000). In fact, in an early study of peaceful resolution, Coplin & Rochester (1972: 533) found that few states have been willing to return to international courts, mainly because they do not think they can win, and this potential outcome could mean that ‘domestic political elements within states can be expected to react negatively to the use of institutions unless there is a clear cut victory’. For example, the ruling political parties of the Japanese government have persevered on their unwillingness to compromise with Russia on the disputed islands of the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands mainly because of the fear of punishment by their constituents, as admitted in surveys and interviews of government ministers (Wiegand, 2011).…”

Section: Theory Of Legalized Dispute Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Powell

Wiegand

2013

Journal of Peace Research

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States involved in territorial disputes have several options with regard to resolving their disputes. What types of states are more likely to resort to legal methods of peaceful resolution in attempting to resolve their territorial disputes? We posit that two separate mechanisms affect states' decisions to choose legal methods of peaceful resolution: the legal mechanism -domestic rule-of-law, and the political mechanism -win/loss record. Rule-of-law based arguments cannot fully explain states' behavior towards arbitration and adjudication. It is the interplay of both of these mechanisms that explains the strategic choices made by states with regards to arbitration and adjudication. We explain why some high rule-of-law states return to binding methods, while others turn to different forums, and why low rule-of-law states consider binding methods. Empirical analyses of all attempts at peaceful resolution of territorial disputes from 1985 to 2006 show that high rule-of-law states are more likely to return to international binding venues only if they have a positive experience with these methods. On the other hand, we find that low rule-of-law states are not concerned with their record of successes/failures when resorting to international binding venues. Overall, the effect of regime type/rule-of-law is conditioned by past successes and failures in international resolution venues.

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“…Partially followingCoplin and Rochester (1972),Raymond (1996) incorporates issues of contractual obligations (1), treatment of persons (2), property damages from military operations (3), and territorial issues and seizures (4) into his four-part scale of the "intensity dimension" of the dispute. Where issues of territory are the biggest determinant of salience of an arbitration outcome in this coding, it may not be surprising that jointly democratic dyads do not differ from other dyad types in meaningful arbitration outcomes.…”

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Democracies, Territory, and Negotiated Compromises

Miller

Gibler

2011

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Multiple studies have confirmed that democracies are more likely than other regime types to resolve their militarized disputes through negotiation and compromise. We argue that these findings have not controlled for the types of disputes that are most likely to involve democracies. States have often resolved their most dangerous disputes, involving territorial issues with neighbors, prior to becoming democratic. Thus, the issues involving democracies are of less salience and are more easily negotiated with compromise. Using Militarized Interstate Dispute data from Correlates of War Project, 1816 to 2001, we confirm this explanation. The pacifying effect of regime type disappears once controls are added for proximity and issue type. We find that territorial issues among contiguous states are among the most difficult issues to resolve, and democracies are unlikely to be involved in these disputes. Our findings are an advancement of the territorial peace argument and present a first step in a re-examination of the broader empirical regularities associated with democratic peace theory.

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The Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice, the League of Nations, and the United Nations: A Comparative Empirical Survey

Cited by 15 publications

References 12 publications

Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover

Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover

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Democracies, Territory, and Negotiated Compromises

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