Democracies, Territory, and Negotiated Compromises

Miller, Steven V.; Gibler, Douglas M.

doi:10.1177/0738894211404797

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…A majority of interstate wars and a large share of intrastate wars are fought over territory . Territorial disputes are associated not only with conflict onset but with its escalation (Braithwaite and Lemke, 2011) and duration (Fuhrmann and Tir, 2009), and have been shown to be significantly more difficult to resolve (Fearon, 2004;Miller and Gibler, 2011;Walter, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contested Ground: Disentangling Material and Symbolic Attachment to Disputed Territory

Manekin¹,

Grossman²,

Mitts³

2018

PSRM

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Territorial disputes are prone to conflict because of the value of territory to publics, whether due to its strategic and material worth, or to its intangible, symbolic value. Yet despite the implications of the distinction for both theory and policy, empirically disentangling the material from the symbolic has posed formidable methodological challenges. We propose a set of tools for assessing the nature of individual territorial attachment, drawing on a series of survey experiments in Israel. Using these tools, we find that a substantial segment of the Jewish population is attached to the disputed West Bank territory for intangible reasons, consisting not only of far-right voters but also of voters of moderate-right and centrist parties. This distribution considerably narrows the bargaining space of leaders regardless of coalitional configurations. Our empirical analysis thus illustrates how the distribution of territorial preferences in the domestic population can have powerful implications for conflict and its resolution.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contested Ground: Disentangling Material and Symbolic Attachment to Disputed Territory

Manekin¹,

Grossman²,

Mitts³

2018

PSRM

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“…For example, I have shown that democracies are not more likely to win their conflicts or fight shorter disputes once issue type is included in the model (Gibler and Miller ). Democracies are also not more likely to negotiate their disputes (Miller and Gibler ) or experience disputes that will provoke high levels of audience costs domestically (Gibler and Hutchison ). These all demonstrate that what we often think of as the Democratic Peace can also just as easily be explained by issue selection.…”

Section: Issue Selection and Conflict Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Contiguous States, Stable Borders, and the Peace between Democracies

Gibler

2014

Int Stud Q

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Park and Colaresi find that border stability does not apply to non-contiguous states. This just confirms, again, an argument I have been making in numerous publications since my original "Bordering on Peace" article. Nevertheless, I use this response to present a replication of my original argument, as it applies to contiguous states, and I find strong support for the contention that the democratic peace can better be understood as a stable border peace. I also discuss several different replications of the original argument using different proxies for stable borders. Each confirms that joint democracy is not a statistically significant predictor of conflict once stable borders are also included in the model. In sum, arguments from the territorial peace have been confirmed in multiple analyses, with multiple data sets, using multiple levels of analysis, and this renders Park and Colaresi's attack on the original "Bordering on Peace" a non sequitur in the debate over stable borders as an explanation of democracy and peace.

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“…Recently a "territorial peace" argument (Miller and Gibler 2011;Gibler 2012) has been advanced positing that democracies are unlikely to be involved in territorial disputes with each other, because settled borders make the development of a democratic system itself more likely. Thus there could be a degree of endogeneity to the observed democratic peace.…”

Section: [Table 2 About Here]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Domestic political institutions and the initiation of international conflict in East Asia: some evidence for an Asian democratic peace

Goldsmith¹

2013

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific

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There is doubt about whether the "democratic peace" proposition applies in Asia. I theoretically deconstruct regime type into institutional components including political competition, constraint on the executive, and mass participation, and ask whether taking these as distinct causal factors gives more empirical purchase on the relationship of domestic political institutions to states' external conflict behavior. I find that higher levels of political competition are associated with a lower likelihood of conflict initiation, but only when the potential target is relatively democratic. Thus my directed dyad analysis is consistent with a democratic peace effect in East Asia. It is also suggestive regarding the observed "East Asian peace" that has existed since 1979, because levels of political competition have risen considerably in the region, beginning in the late 1970s.

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Democracies, Territory, and Negotiated Compromises

Cited by 18 publications

References 63 publications

Contested Ground: Disentangling Material and Symbolic Attachment to Disputed Territory

Contested Ground: Disentangling Material and Symbolic Attachment to Disputed Territory

Contiguous States, Stable Borders, and the Peace between Democracies

Domestic political institutions and the initiation of international conflict in East Asia: some evidence for an Asian democratic peace

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